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Objectives: 
The  objective  of  this  thesis  is  to  examine  whether  discretion  is  used  in  the  
purchase price allocation decisions in companies listed in OMX Helsinki in 2007.  
 
Data: 
The sample consists of companies listed in OMX Helsinki reporting acquisitions 
in their 2007 financial statements. Companies operating in the financial services 
industry are excluded due to their different financial characteristics. Thus, the 
sample  consists  of  54  observations.  The  data  is  extracted  from  the  financial  
statements of the sample companies and Bloomberg database.  
 
Results: 
No evidence was found that discretion in the allocation decision is used in order 
to manage earnings. Instead, a negative association between the size of the 
acquirer and proportionate allocation to goodwill was documented implying that 
scarcity of accounting resources or political costs impact the allocation decision. 
Moreover, evidence was found that companies in technology, media and telecom 
sector allocate proportionately more to other intangible assets than companies 
operating in other sectors. Also, a positive association between the R&D activity 
of the acquirer and allocation to intangible assets was documented. These further 
consolidate the findings implicating that the reported allocations do not deviate 
from the underlying economics as a result of earnings management. 
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HARKINNANVARAISUUDEN HYVÄKSIKÄYTTÖ KAUPPAHINNAN ALLOKOINNISSA 
Tutkimus suomalaisella aineistolla 
 
Tutkimuksen tarkoitus: 
Tutkielman tarkoituksena on selvittää käytetäänkö kauppahinnan 
allokointipäätökseen liittyvää harkinnanvaraisuutta hyväksi Helsingin 
pörssissä listatuissa yrityksissä vuonna 2007.  
 
Aineisto: 
Tutkimusaineisto muodostuu Helsingin pörssissä listatuista yrityksistä, 
jotka raportoivat yritysjärjestelyjä vuoden 2007 tilinpäätöksissään. 
Rahoitusalalla toimivat yhtiöt on suljettu pois aineistosta niiden erilaisten 
taloudellisten ominaisuuksien takia. Aineisto koostuu 54 havainnosta. 
Aineisto on kerätty yritysten tilinpäätöksistä ja Bloomberg-tietokannasta. 
 
Tulokset: 
 
Todisteita allokointipäätöksen käytöstä tuloksenohjailukeinona ei 
löytynyt. Sen sijaan tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että ostajayhtiön koolla ja 
allokoinnilla liikearvolle on negatiivinen yhteys. Tämä voi merkitä sitä, 
että resurssien puutteella tai poliittisilla kustannuksilla on vaikutusta 
allokointipäätökseen. Tulokset osoittavat myös, että teknologia-, media- ja 
tietoliikennetoimialalla toimivat ostajayhtiöt allokoivat suuremman osan 
kauppahinnasta muille aineettomille hyödykkeille kuin muilla toimialoilla 
toimivat yhtiöt. Lisäksi havaittiin, että ostajayhtiön T&K- kulujen ja 
muille aineettomille hyödykkeille allokoinnin välillä on positiivinen 
yhteys. Nämä löydökset tukevat havaintoa, etteivät raportoidut allokoinnit 
poikkea todellisesta tilanteesta johtuen tuloksenohjailusta. 
 
Avainsanat: 
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Definitions 
 
The following clarifies some of the central terms used later on in this paper. The purpose 
of the section is to facilitate reading and understanding of this paper. The terminology is 
listed in an alphabetical order, not as the terms appear in the text. 
 
Amortization  Systematic allocation of the depreciable 
amount of an intangible asset over its useful 
life.   
      
 
Business combination (IFRS 3)  Bringing together of separate entities or 
businesses into one reporting entity. Forms 
of joint-venture or obtaining assets or a 
group  of  assets  that  does  not  constitute  a  
business do not count for a business 
combination. 
 
Intangible asset A non-monetary asset with no physical 
substance. 
 
Fair value The  amount  for  which  an  asset  could  be  
exchanged, or a liability settled, between 
knowledgeable and willing parties at arm’s 
length.  
 
Goodwill The amount paid for a business in excess of 
the fair value of its identifiable net assets at 
the  date  of  acquisition.  Measured  as  the  
difference between the fair value of 
consideration transferred and the net of the 
 vii 
 
amounts of the acquired identifiable assets 
and assumed liabilities on the acquisition 
date.   
 
Purchase Price Allocation The allocation of the cost of an acquisition 
to the fair values of the underlying assets 
and liabilities, both tangible and intangible. 
 
Cost of combination/Purchase price The fair values, at the date of exchange, of 
assets given, liabilities incurred or assumed, 
and equity instruments issued by the acquirer, 
in exchange for control of the acquiree; plus 
any costs directly attributable to the business 
combination.  
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1.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
IFRS became effective in Finland in the beginning of 2005. It was based on the European Union 
decision dating back to 2002 to require European companies listed in an EU securities market to 
prepare their consolidated financial statements according to IFRS from financial year 2005 
onwards. IFRS 3 – Business Combinations (hereafter IFRS 3) was originally issued in 2004 with 
effect on business combinations completed after 31 March 2004.  
 
Prior to adopting IFRS, Finnish listed companies accounted for business combinations (and 
possible subsequent goodwill) under Finnish Accounting Act. According to Finnish Accounting 
Act, the acquirer is obligated to amortize goodwill during its economic useful life (20 years at 
maximum). Under IFRS, companies are no longer allowed to amortize goodwill, but instead, 
goodwill must be subjected to annual impairment testing based on the expected future cash 
flows.   
 
Goodwill impairment testing has been criticized for being too subjective. Impairment testing has 
been  argued  to  allow  management  to  use  discretion  in  the  timing  of  the  impairments  and  e.g.  
avoid recording impairment charges in years when earnings look bad and vice versa.  
 
Similarly, there is a high level of discretion related to purchase price allocation in recognition 
between goodwill and intangible assets.  The more goodwill is recorded in connection with the 
allocation, the more room there is for discretion in terms of the impairment charges in the future. 
The allocation decision does not have to be made on the day the transaction is completed so it 
can be done simultaneously with earnings follow-up. The discretion related to purchase price 
allocation is further discussed in section 2.3. 
 
If the reported allocation does not fully correspond to the actual underlying economics, the 
capital markets’ valuations are based on incorrect information, which is likely to lead to 
disturbance in price formation.  
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Acquisitions often constitute a notable share of companies’ growth and, therefore, it is crucial to 
have accurate information on acquisitions, on which the estimates of the future value of the 
company are based. Deviation of the reported purchase price allocation from the actual 
underlying economics dilutes the accuracy of the acquisition information and may result in 
drastic errors in valuations.  
 
1.2 Purpose  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether discretion is used in the purchase price 
allocation decision that makes the reported allocation deviate from the underlying economics. 
Also neglecting the allocation process due to e.g. a lack of resources is regarded as use of 
discretion in this paper as an external appraiser could be hired to conduct the allocation. 
 
In this paper, purchase price is defined similarly to PwC (2005) and FFSA (2006, 2007), i.e. as 
the difference between the enterprise value and net debt and is divided into three components: 
 
1) Goodwill.  Goodwill  is  the  amount  that  is  reported  on  the  financial  statements  in  
connection with the purchase price allocation disclosures. 
2) Other intangible assets. Other intangible assets are defined as all intangible assets 
deducted by goodwill. 
3) Other net assets. Other net assets are defined as the purchase price deducted by goodwill 
and other intangible assets. 
Thus, non-controlling interests and translation differences are included in other net assets. 
However, the overall impact of these items is very minor and other net assets consist almost 
entirely of tangible assets. 
Even though the discretion in purchase price allocation is mainly related to goodwill, the impact 
of company-specific characteristics on allocations to other intangible assets and other net assets 
are also tested. 
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Testing the allocation to other intangible assets can be seen as a reversed examination. E.g., 
certain industries are considered more intangible asset intensive than others (e.g. information 
technology versus banking) (Collins et al., 1997, Lev and Zarowin, 1999). Therefore, it can be 
argued that in acquisitions taking place within intangible asset intensive industries the relative 
allocation to other intangible assets should be larger than in other industries. Similarly, an 
extensive R&D activity can be argued to lead to a higher level of intangible assets. 
If, however, this is not the case, it would give a reason to suspect that the allocation does not 
correspond to the underlying economics. Since the excess purchase price, and how it is 
structured, varies case by case, there is no straight trade-off between allocation to goodwill and 
other intangible assets. Therefore, allocation to other intangible assets must also be examined.  
As  there  is  a  lot  of  subjectivity  related  to  the  allocation  of  the  purchase  price,  the  underlying  
accounting procedures are not verifiable. In order to illustrate the role verifiability plays in the 
purchase price allocation, an analysis to explain allocation to other net assets is also conducted. 
This is done because the valuation of other net assets is likely to involve less discretion as 
tangible assets are always recorded, either purchased or internally constructed. Barth et al. (1998) 
and Wyatt (2005) argue that reliability is the main reason why intangible assets are not always 
recorded.  
These arguments imply that valuation of tangible asset, in general, involves less discretion and is 
more reliable. Therefore, allocation to other net assets is tested by using the same set of variables 
as for goodwill with the expectation that the same variables that explain allocation to goodwill 
do not explain allocation to other net assets because of the high level of discretion related to 
recognition of goodwill compared to recognition of other net assets. 
However, allocation to goodwill and other intangible assets are the main focus area of this paper 
as they are not previously recorded in the acquiree’s balance sheet, and, therefore, have no 
“reference values”. According to Vuorela (2008), fair value adjustments to net tangible assets are 
often minor compared to goodwill and other intangible assets. Consequently, the fair value of net 
tangible assets is often close to the book value of net tangible assets in the acquiree’s balance 
sheet.  
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The fair value of the acquiree can be verified at the time of the acquisition, but the fair values of 
individual assets cannot. Moreover, the allocation decision has a direct impact on the acquirer’s 
accounting earnings. Thus, there is a remarkable component of discretion related to identification 
and valuation of intangible assets.  
1.3 Contribution 
 
Earnings management, value-relevance of goodwill and the use of goodwill as an earnings 
management tool have been widely studied. However, research on goodwill as an earnings 
management tool focuses mainly on the timing of the impairments, not on the initial recognition 
of goodwill. Therefore, research on whether discretion is used in the recognition decision is very 
limited. The limited amount of research conducted on this topic is understandable because 
accounting standards prohibiting amortization of goodwill and requiring impairments instead are 
fairly new. In Finland, companies listed in OMX Helsinki have applied these new accounting 
rules only in three sets of financial statements and the practice is still findings its shape.  
 
This paper contributes to the very limited amount of research conducted on the initial recognition 
of intangible assets and goodwill and whether there are factors that make the allocation decision 
deviate from the actual underlying economics. Zhang and Zhang (2007) found evidence that the 
allocation decision is used as an earnings management tool in the United States, which makes it 
necessary to examine whether similar findings can be made using Finnish data. In addition, 
Rantsi (2007), in his master’s thesis, studied the application of IFRS 3 in OMX Helsinki and 
whether the acquiring companies’ characteristics in general have an impact on the allocation of 
the purchase price. However, Rantsi (2007) did not place a lot of weight on the possibility of use 
of discretion but focused more on the impact of factors that are not related to use of discretion. 
 
Furthermore, research on this topic is evolving rapidly and recent publications are discussed in 
this paper. In addition, in the light of prior research, this paper discusses the possible 
consequences of manipulating the purchase price allocation. 
 
 
  
5 
1.4 Research outline 
 
The second chapter provides an insight on purchase price allocation in general, discusses how it 
is prone to discretion and further motivates the research. The third chapter discusses the 
institutional settings of the research to provide an understanding of the theoretical framework of 
this paper. The institutional settings of the research in this paper means discussion of the 
accounting standards under which business combinations, goodwill and intangible assets are 
accounted for.  
 
The fourth chapter discusses relevant literature and prior research. Moreover, the fourth chapter 
binds the prior research and literature together with the research problem of this paper to provide 
a passageway into and further motivation for the research conducted in this paper. The fifth 
chapter further discusses prior research and literature, based on which the hypotheses can be 
built. 
 
The sixth chapter provides a description of the data used in the empirical research and discusses 
the research methods employed in analyzing the data. The seventh chapter presents the results of 
the empirical research, discusses and reflects them with theories and findings of previous studies.  
In the eighth chapter, the findings are summarized. In addition, implications and possibilities for 
further research are discussed.  
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2. Purchase price allocation 
2.1 Definition of purchase price allocation 
 
Purchase price allocation is necessary when a lump-sum purchase price is paid for a bundle of 
assets and liabilities. The paid purchase price must, for accounting purposes, be divided among 
the acquired assets and liabilities by the acquirer. IFRS 3 requires the purchase price to be 
allocated at the date of the acquisition to all identifiable assets and liabilities that meet the 
applicable recognition criteria. The acquired assets must be reported in the acquirer’s balance 
sheet at their fair values (considering minority interest, if applicable). This is done to transform 
the book-value balance sheet of the acquired company into a fair value balance sheet (KPMG, 
2007). The remaining value (after taking into consideration any deferred taxes) is recognized as 
goodwill. Figure 1 illustrates the determination of goodwill to be recognized. 
 
Acquisition cost
-
-
+
+
+/-
=
fair value of tangible assets
fair value of intangible assets
fair value of liabilities
fair value of contingent liabilities 
deferred taxes
Goodwill as residual value
Business combination Acquisition cost Purchase price 
allocation
Goodwill
 
Figure 1. Determination of goodwill to be recognized. Source: KPMG (2007). Modified. 
 
The key driver behind purchase price allocation is to make the acquisition process more 
transparent, i.e. to identify and value the acquired assets thus arriving at the residual amount that 
represents goodwill (Deloitte, 2007).  In a business combination the acquirer must measure (i.e. 
allocate) the purchased assets at their acquisition-date fair values. For accounting purposes, this 
represents “a complex challenge” for the acquirer. The process of allocating the purchase price, 
as required by IFRS 3, involves defining the purchase price, identifying the “hidden reserves and 
charges” embedded in the assets recognized in the acquiree’s balance sheet, as well as 
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identifying and measuring the assets previously not recognized in the acquiree’s balance sheet 
(KPMG 2007). Figure 2 illustrates the elements of purchase price allocation. 
 
Analysis Identification Valuation Accounting
•Determination whether
transaction requires
PPA
•Identification of the 
acquirer
•Determination of 
purchase price and 
acquisition date
•Transaction rationale
and business plan
analysis
•Identification of all 
acquired assets and 
liabilities deviating 
from their respective 
fair values 
•Identification of 
previously not 
recognized intangible 
assets and contingent 
liabilities
•Check on recognition 
criteria regarding the 
identified assets and 
liabilities
•Determination of 
valuation methods and 
key assumptions
•Determination of 
valuation parameters 
(e.g. cost of capital)
•Fair value calculations
•Deferred tax 
calculation
•Residual goodwill 
derivation/Analysis of 
potential negative 
goodwill
•Goodwill, asset and 
liability allocation to 
cash generating units
•Execution of necessary 
accounting adjustments 
and bookings
•Reporting
 
Figure 2. Elements of purchase price allocation. Source: KPMG (2007). 
 
Allocation of the paid consideration added with additional costs (e.g. professional service fees) 
incurred from the transaction can be regarded as an indicator of expectations and motives that are 
associated  with  the  acquisition.  In  addition,  the  outcome of  the  allocation  compared  to  similar  
transactions can be used as a basis for analyzing the benefits of the transaction. Moreover, the 
amount of the residual goodwill may provide signals of the reasonableness of the paid 
contribution. (KPMG, 2007) 
 
Allocating the purchase price is a complex, technical and organizationally challenging process, 
the consequences of which are regularly underestimated when the process is initiated. (KPMG, 
2007) 
 
2.2 Importance of purchase price allocation 
 
According to Deloitte (2007), the company value that is derived from intangible assets has 
increased substantially in today’s knowledge based economy. The market value of many publicly 
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traded companies significantly exceeds the book value and Deloitte (2007) attributes this, to a 
large extent, to assets that are not presented on the balance sheet. This clearly highlights the ever 
increasing significance of intangible assets and their importance in acquisitions (Deloitte, 2007). 
 
Intangible assets, such as technologies or patents, are often seen as value drivers of the target of 
the acquisition and, therefore, they present a strong interest for the acquiring company (even 
acting as a motivator for the transaction). Internally generated intangible assets are usually not 
recognized in the balance sheet of the target and, according to KPMG (2007), these assets 
generally account for the majority of the surplus value of the consideration. Identifying and 
recognizing these assets require a thorough and precise analysis of the whole business model of 
the target company (KPMG, 2007).  
 
Therefore, it is crucial to conduct a thorough process of allocating the purchase price in order to 
provide the capital markets information that enables the markets to properly evaluate 
acquisitions. Moreover, the allocation has a direct impact on the future operating results, which 
enables the allocation decision to be used as an earnings management tool. 
 
2.3 Accounting discretion in purchase price allocation 
 
Impairment testing of goodwill has been argued to be overly subjective and to open an 
opportunity to earnings management because management is able to use discretion in the timing 
of the impairment charges. Postponing the goodwill impairment charges into the future would 
make accounting earnings of the current reporting period look better. The impairment could be 
recorded when pre-impairment earnings look better and there is “more room” for impairments.  
 
Evidence of the use of goodwill as an earnings management tool has been found. Sevin and 
Schroeder (2005) found that using discretion in the timing of the goodwill impairments allow 
companies to manage earnings. Further research supports these findings (e.g. Haman and Jubb, 
2008, Van de Poel et. al, 2008).  These findings are further discussed in section 4.1. 
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Despite the consistent findings that goodwill is used as an earnings management tool, the initial 
recognition of goodwill has not received much attention. Based on prior research and the fact 
that postponing goodwill impairments makes the current period look better, it can be argued that 
discretion in the initial recognition of goodwill can be used.  
 
The excess purchase price over the book value of the acquiree’s net assets consists either of 
goodwill, intangible assets previously not recognized in the acquiree’s balance sheet or both. 
IFRS 3 requires the acquirer to identify and recognize as many intangible assets apart from 
goodwill as possible and minimize the amount of recorded goodwill.  
 
According to IAS 38, intangible assets must be amortized during their economic useful lives. 
Amortization charges would instantly depress reported earnings but instead of recognizing 
intangible assets, management may use its discretion and record goodwill instead of duly 
recognizing intangible assets. This would enable management to use discretion in the timing of 
the impairment charges instead of immediate amortization of intangible assets. Figure 3 
illustrates the discretion related to the allocation decision. 
 
Purchase price
Other net assets
Other intangible
assetsGoodwill
I Actual underlying economics
II Reported allocation
Other net assetsOther intangible
assets
Goodwill
 
Figure 3. Discretion related to purchase price allocation. 
 
Figure 3 represents a case where the reported allocation does not correspond to the underlying 
economics because an amount in excess of the actual value of goodwill is recorded to goodwill 
instead of duly recognizing all the identifiable intangible assets that the acquirer has paid for.  
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It can be argued that also factors that are not driven by incentives to boost earnings can lead to 
use of discretion in the allocation decision. For example, FFSA (2006, 2007) found that the 
purchase price allocation decision is influenced by scarcity of accounting resources in 
companies. A lack of resources would, according to FFSA (2007), compel companies to allocate 
a larger proportion of the excess price to goodwill instead of intangible assets as allocation to 
intangible assets is time consuming and requires special skills. 
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3. Institutional settings of the research 
3.1 IFRS 3 
3.1.1 Objective of IFRS 3 
 
The  objective  of  IFRS  3  is  to  improve  the  relevance,  reliability  and  comparability  of  the  
information that a reporting entity provides in its financial statement about a business 
combination and its effects. To accomplish that, IFRS 3 establishes principles and requirements 
for how the acquirer: 
 
(a) Recognizes and measures in its financial statement the identifiable assets acquired, the 
liabilities assumed and any non-controlling interest in the acquiree;   
(b) Recognizes and measures the goodwill acquired in the business combination or a gain from a 
bargain purchase; and  
(c) Determines the information to be disclosed to enable users of the financial statement to 
evaluate the nature and financial effects of the business combination (IFRS 3.1) 
3.1.2 Acquisition method 
 
Under IFRS 3 the acquirer is obligated to account for a business combination using the 
acquisition method (IFRS 3.4) with the exception of 
a) Combinations involving related entities, i.e. entities under common control 
b) Formation of a joint venture 
c) Acquisition of an asset or a group of assets that does not constitute a business.   
Accounting for such entities falls out of the scope of IFRS 3 even though it can be considered as 
merger accounting. For such cases, pooling (historical cost) method is recommended under IFRS 
3 (if there is substance to the transaction) (IFRS 3.2). 
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Applying the acquisition method consists of the four following steps: 
1. Identifying “the acquirer” – the entity that obtains control of the acquiree 
2. Determining “the acquisition date”, i.e. the date on which the acquirer obtains control of the 
acquiree  
3. Recognizing and measuring the identifiable assets acquired, liabilities assumed and any non-
controlling interest (NCI) in the target (NCI is measured as a minority’s percentage of the fair 
value under IFRS 3) (IFRS3.5) 
4. Recognizing and measuring goodwill or a gain from a bargain purchase. 
(IFRS3.5) 
 
If an intangible asset is acquired as a part of a business combination, it must be recognized 
separately if the asset meets the criteria defined in IAS 38 (Intangible assets) (IFRS 3.13). These 
criteria and accounting for intangible assets under IAS 38 are discussed in section 3.2. IFRS 3 
includes a list of intangible assets that satisfy the criteria of being recognized apart from 
goodwill. Examples of such intangible assets can be found in table 5.  
 
The acquirer’s application of the recognition principle and conditions may result in recognition 
of some assets and liabilities that the acquiree had not previously recognized as assets and 
liabilities in its financial statement. For example, the acquirer recognizes the acquired 
identifiable intangible assets, such as brand names, patents or customer relationships, that the 
acquiree did not recognize as assets in its financial statement because it developed them 
internally and charged the related costs to expense (IFRS 3.13). 
 
Goodwill is calculated as the residual value between the purchase price of the acquired business 
and the sum of fair values of acquired assets and assumed liabilities taking into account any 
deferred tax charges or credits. In case of a negative residual (the total fair value of acquired 
assets exceeds the consideration paid, far less common than emergence of goodwill), companies 
accounting under IFRS 3 are first required to conduct a thorough review of the allocation process 
to check the accuracy. If the residual remains negative even on validation, it must be charged to 
the profit and loss account (IFRS 3.36). Under IFRS 3 (the actual guiding standard being IAS 36) 
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goodwill amortization is not permitted. Instead, goodwill must be tested for impairment annually 
(IAS 36.96). 
3.1.3 Determining fair values and valuation approaches 
 
Under IFRS 3, the acquirer must recognize the acquired tangible and intangible assets as well as 
the assumed liabilities on their acquisition-date fair values (IFRS 3.18). Even though the acquirer 
on a frequent basis encounters difficulties in determining the fair values of the acquired assets 
and assumed liabilities already recognized in the acquiree’s balance sheet, according to KPMG 
(2007), identification and valuation of intangible assets previously not presented in the 
acquiree’s balance sheet pose the greatest challenge in purchase price allocation. These represent 
the cases where the criteria for recognition were not previously met.  
 
Determination of the fair values is essential for a proper application of the acquisition method. 
Still, guidance on the fair value determination is rather limited. The standard itself does not 
contain guidance on determining the fair value of an asset. However, it is important to 
understand where the fair value of intangible assets is derived from. The following paragraphs 
provide an insight on how the fair values of intangible assets can be determined. 
 
Valuation (and the subsequent amortization) of intangible assets is not a purely scientific process 
and subjectivity is involved in both the interpretation and application of the standards (Cranford 
and Moore, 2004). According to Deloitte (2007), differences in opinion may emerge in company 
management concerning the key intangible assets acquired. The identification of such assets is 
likely to lead to much debate. 
 
Valuating the acquired intangible assets can be carried out using either a market, income or cost 
approach. The following briefly clarifies the main methods used in valuation of the acquired 
intangible assets. The methods are introduced to illustrate the challenges related to the valuation 
process.  
 
a) Market approach is widely regarded as the most reliable estimate of the fair value since the 
value is derived from the prices in an actively-functioning market using multiples.  However, 
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there can be a major downside to this, which prevents this method from being used. Intangible 
assets acquired are often unique in nature and there is a lack of information about similar prior 
transactions.   
 
b) Income approach is the most widely used valuation method. It is based on the present value of 
the future economic benefits expected to be generated by the asset. The difficulty of this method 
lies in attributing and projecting the future cash flows generated by the asset, defining the 
appropriate discount rate and estimating the remaining useful life of the asset. The determination 
of appropriate assumptions requires experience and judgment due to the subjectivity inherent to 
the process. 
 
c) Cost approach is founded on the supposition that the acquirer would not pay for an intangible 
asset more than it would cost to reproduce a similar asset that could be used to replace the 
acquired asset. To arrive at the fair value, all costs including the opportunity cost involved in 
reproducing the assets and deductions for obsolescence must be taken into account. (Deloitte, 
2007) 
 
Determining the cost of capital poses a challenge in performing the valuation based on the 
income approach. The cost of capital should reflect the risks and rewards related to the asset that 
is being valued. Similarly, when drawing up projections on the future economic benefits, they 
should be duly reviewed as they will have an impact on the value and thus a bearing to the 
impairment reviews conducted in the future.  
 
According to Deloitte (2007), when performing the valuation, possible double counting must be 
avoided. I.e. it must be taken into account that the same intangible assets may make a 
contribution  on  the  same stream of  earnings.  An example  of  such  case  could  be  a  well-known 
trademark and technology that the trademark is (at least partly) based on. However, it is often 
difficult to separate intangible assets due to their interconnectivity. 
 
Due to the variety of challenges related to determining the fair value of an intangible asset and 
the required skills, it would most likely be the easiest way for companies to just allocate the 
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excess price entirely to goodwill, even if there were recognizable intangible assets transferred in 
the business combination. Employing external appraisers is often seen as costly and unnecessary 
as excessive allocation to goodwill has not induced sanction procedures by the Financial 
Supervision of Finland. Therefore, it can be assumed that the adequacy of resources may have an 
impact on the reported allocation.  
3.1.4 Required disclosures 
 
IFRS 3(.64) lists a rather comprehensive selection of required disclosures on a business 
combination. According to IASB (International Accounting Standards Board), the purpose of the 
disclosure requirements is to increase the relevance, reliability and comparability of the disclosed 
information on business combinations (IFRS 3.1). The disclosure requirements include 
information on e.g. the target (name, description), acquisition date, percentage of voting equity 
interest acquired, acquisition date fair value of the total consideration transferred and primary 
reasons behind the acquisition. These disclosures have been rather limited in financial statements 
of companies listed in OMX Helsinki (FFSA, 2006, 2007), which hinders the assessment of the 
acquisitions. 
3.1.5 Pros and cons of IFRS 3 
 
There are certain limitations in IFRS 3, due to which the standard has been criticized by both 
practitioners and academicians. 
 
Goodwill that has been brought forward at the date of adoption of IFRS 3 (which is often 
significant) has been “frozen” at the value it was brought forward at. The “frozen” goodwill 
represents the historic goodwill capitalized less pre-IFRS 3 amortization. This added with post-
IFRS 3 goodwill recognized less impairment charges under IFRS 3 sums up to the total goodwill 
in reports and accounts. Even though the reported goodwill in post-IFRS 3 accounts is 
significant, it is difficult to comprehend such a complicated combination of concepts. As a result, 
goodwill is not often readily understood. (Forbes, 2007) 
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IFRS 3 has been widely criticized for no longer allowing the amortization of goodwill. Ojala 
(2007) in his dissertation studied the informativeness of goodwill amortization and concluded 
that the goodwill amortization practice provides investors with useful information in cases where 
amortization periods are sufficiently short, i.e. where they better reflect the economic useful life 
of the underlying asset.  
 
Bugeja and Gallery (2006) found recently purchased goodwill to have information content, 
whereas “older” goodwill was not perceived as having future economic benefits. This seems to 
be in line with Ojala’s (2007) findings about sufficiently short amortization periods. Li and 
Meeks (2006) confirmed prior evidence of value-relevance of purchased goodwill on the year of 
acquisition but, in contrast to Ojala’s (2007) findings, found the value-relevance to fade 
thereafter and the amortization to be value-irrelevant. No uniform evidence of value-relevance of 
goodwill amortization has been presented and it may have been one of the drivers behind IASB’s 
decision to reject amortization of goodwill and replace it with goodwill impairment testing.  
 
Moreover, goodwill treatment under IFRS 3 has received criticism also for the impairment 
procedure being too discretionary and allowing it to be used for managing earnings.  Van de Poel 
et al. (2008) studied the role of goodwill as an earnings management tool using a sample 
consisting of listed companies in 15 EU countries in 2005-2006. Van de Poel et al. (2008) found 
that occurrence of goodwill impairments was highly influenced by financial reporting incentives 
and was thus used as a tool for earnings management. However, Van de Poel et al. (2008) 
inferred that a Big 4 company as an auditor constrains the use of goodwill as an earnings 
management tool but does not remove it entirely. Despite Big 4 auditors, goodwill accounting is 
used to manage earnings and therefore, it is important to examine also the initial recognition of 
goodwill and whether it is used as an earnings management tool. 
 
Despite  the  critique,  according  to  numerous  studies,  IFRS  3  does,  in  theory,  increase  the  
informativeness and transparency in merger accounting by prohibiting the use of the pooling 
method (where the assets and liabilities of the acquirer and acquiree are added together at 
historical book values). Prior to adopting IFRS, Finnish listed companies have accounted for 
business combinations under Finnish GAAP, which allows the acquirer to use either the pooling 
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method or the purchase (acquisition) method. The use of the pooling method was allowed if the 
acquirer, acquiree and the transaction met certain criteria. Otherwise, the acquirer was to use the 
purchase method (KPL 6§9).  
 
For instance, Hong et al. (1978) reported significant abnormal returns in the period surrounding 
the merger date for companies using the purchase method instead of the pooling method.  Davis 
(1990) replicated and extended the study of Hong et al. (1978) using a different time period and 
sample. Davis (1990) reported significant stock market responses for companies using the 
purchase method, whereas using the pooling method did not yield significant abnormal returns. 
This suggests that the purchase method does provide the investors with more useful information 
about the completed transactions. 
 
3.2 IAS 38 
3.2.1 Definition of intangible asset and recognition criteria 
 
Under IAS 38, an intangible asset is defined as an identifiable, non-monetary asset with no 
physical substance. An intangible asset is required to be identifiable and separable, which 
distinguishes it from goodwill. An asset is a resource that is controlled by the enterprise as a 
result of past events (purchase or self-creation) and from which future economic benefits 
(inflows of cash or other assets) are expected. Thus, definition of intangible asset has three 
critical attributes: 
? identifiability 
? control (power to obtain benefits from the asset) 
? future economic benefits (IAS 38.8) 
 
A company must recognize an intangible asset, whether purchased of self-created, if and only if, 
it satisfies the following recognition criteria: 
? it is probable that the future economic benefits, that are attributable to the asset, will flow 
to the enterprise;  
? the cost of the asset can be measured reliably. (IAS 38.21) 
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3.2.2 Intangible assets in business combinations 
 
An intangible asset is initially recognized at cost. If an intangible asset does not meet both the 
definition of and the criteria for recognition as an intangible asset, the related expenditure must 
be recognized as an expense when it is incurred (IAS 38.68). Based on these criteria, many self-
created intangible assets are expensed (e.g. advertising, which may result in a valuable brand) 
and, therefore, cannot be seen in the acquiree’s balance sheet. 
On the  other  hand,  according  to  IAS 38  (and  IFRS 3),  in  a  business  combination  the  acquirer  
recognizes an intangible asset of the acquiree at the acquisition date, separately from goodwill, 
regardless of whether the asset had been recognized by the acquiree before the business 
combination (if it meets the definition of and satisfies the criteria for recognizing an intangible 
asset). (IAS 38.34) 
For example, according to IAS 38.54, all research costs should be expensed as they are incurred 
and development costs are capitalized only after the technical feasibility of the asset for sale or 
use has been established (IAS 38.57). On the contrary, an R&D project acquired in a business 
combination is recognized as an asset at cost even if the project has a research component. 
Subsequent expenditure on the project is accounted for as any other R&D cost (IAS 38.34). 
 
Due to the general rule of expensing internally generated intangible assets under IAS 38, 
intangible assets internally generated by the acquiree may form a remarkable part of the purchase 
price in a business combination as those assets are measured and recognized at their fair values 
in the acquirer’s balance sheet. 
In IAS 38, there is an assumption that the fair value of an intangible asset acquired in a business 
combination can be measured reliably (IAS 38.35). An expenditure on an intangible item 
included in the cost of acquisition that does not meet both the definition of and recognition 
criteria for an intangible asset should form a part of the amount attributed to the goodwill 
recognized at the acquisition date. 
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Nevertheless, according to IAS 38, non-recognition due to measurement reliability should be 
rare:  
 
The only circumstances in which it might not be possible to measure reliably the fair value of an 
intangible asset acquired in a business combination are when the intangible asset arises from 
legal or other contractual rights and either:  
(a) is not separable; or  
(b) is separable, but there is no history or evidence of exchange transactions for the same or 
similar asset, and otherwise estimating the fair value would be dependent on immeasurable 
variables. (IAS 38.38) 
 
3.2.3 Impact of intangible asset amortization 
 
Intangible assets are classified into two categories. Intangible assets with:  
 
? Indefinite life: No foreseeable limit to the period, over which the asset is expected to 
generate net cash inflows for the entity. 
? Finite life: A limited period of benefit to the entity. 
 
Intangible assets with a finite useful life are amortized using either a straight-line, diminishing 
balance or units-of-production method. The amortization method should reflect the pattern of 
economic benefits derived from the asset.  Intangible assets with an indefinite useful life are not 
amortized but tested for impairment on annual basis according to IAS 36. Under IFRS, intangible 
assets other than goodwill are allowed to be revaluated to fair value. However, because 
revaluation requires reference to an active market for the specific type of intangible, this is a 
relatively uncommon practice (IAS 38.97). Assets with indefinite economic lives are not 
subjected to amortization. 
 
One of the greatest challenges posed by accounting for intangible assets is defining the 
appropriate economic life for each item or category of acquired assets. Some assets, such as 
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brand names, may be considered to have a long or indefinite life but others (e.g. customer 
relationships or databases) may be amortized over a shorter period. (Deloitte, 2007)  
 
However, IFRS does not allow the amortization of goodwill. Instead, the goodwill must be 
reviewed for impairment on annual basis. The reduced amortization charge will initially have a 
positive effect on earnings. Nonetheless, the impairment reviews conducted annually may result 
in volatility in reported earnings. If a projection for a certain intangible asset, a brand, for 
instance, overstates the revenues derived from that asset, a significant write-down on the asset 
may become necessary thus increasing the volatility in reported earnings. Also post-acquisition 
changes in recognized brand names could lead to significant write-downs. (Deloitte, 2007) 
 
Such volatility is likely to unnerve the capital markets. Hence, it is vital to perform an adequate 
process of allocating the purchase price for an acquisition so as to avoid undue volatility in 
reported earnings. Also, according to Deloitte (2007), it is in the best interest of companies to 
ensure that the acquired intangible assets are properly identified and separated from goodwill. 
This is supported also by findings of prior research papers (e.g. Kimbrough, 2007) discussed 
later in this paper.   
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4. Prior research and literature 
4.1 Goodwill  
 
Research on earnings management related to goodwill accounting is still rather limited. 
However, research on the use of discretion in goodwill accounting has been conducted. E.g. 
Sevin and Schroeder (2005) found that recording goodwill impairments instead of amortization 
allows companies to manage earnings.  Further research suggests that companies do utilize that 
possibility. Haman and Jubb (2008) found that managers tend to use discretion in the timing of 
goodwill impairments to manage the accounting earnings of certain years upwards by postponing 
impairment charges. Moreover, Van de Poel et al. (2008) found that goodwill impairments are 
highly associated with financial reporting incentives and are not uniform across auditors and 
European countries. According to Van de Poel et al. (2008), these findings show that 
opportunities for earnings management under IFRS still exist and they seem to have found their 
way in the implementation of the standard. These findings suggest that the purchase price 
allocation decision could also be used as an earnings management tool. 
 
If the allocation decision is used as an earnings management tool, instead of duly identifying and 
recognizing intangible assets, an excess amount of the purchase price is recorded to goodwill. 
Based on the research on value-relevance of goodwill, it can be argued that excessive allocation 
to goodwill may lead to distortion in valuations. 
 
For example, Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) identified consistently positive market value 
influences of accounting goodwill numbers in the manufacturing sector.  Chauvin and Hirschey 
(1994) inferred that goodwill data offers a useful perspective on the ongoing hard-to-measure 
concern value component of the economic value of the company. Furthermore, McCarthy and 
Schneider (1995) made findings that support Chauvin and Hirschey’s (1994) contention that the 
markets regard accounting goodwill numbers as a useful indicator of goodwill assets. In their 
study, Jennings et al. (1996) presented corroborating strong evidence that investors value the 
purchased goodwill as an economic resource.  If, however, the initial recognition of goodwill 
deviates from the underlying economics, the investors base their valuations on incorrect 
information. 
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According to Johnson and Petrone (1998), components that do not represent the real, ‘true’ 
goodwill can, however, be a part of goodwill. Johnson and Petrone (1998) divided goodwill into 
six components. Two of the components, fair values of 1) the going concern element of the 
acquiree’s existing business and 2) synergies from combining the acquirer’s and acquiree’s 
businesses and net assets from the ‘true goodwill’. The other four components that do not qualify 
for  ‘true  goodwill’  but  still  form  a  part  of  it  are  in  Jonhson’s  and  Petrone’s  classification  as  
follows: 1) excess of the fair values over the book values of the acquiree’s recognized net assets 
2) the fair values of other net assets not recognized by the acquiree (e.g. know-how) 3) 
overvaluation of the consideration paid by the acquirer 4) overpayment by the acquirer. 
 
Henning et al. (2000) examined whether the markets make distinction between identifiable 
components of goodwill for valuation purposes. Henning et al. (2000) partitioned the target 
firm’s value as a going concern, the synergy gains of the acquisition and overvaluation of the 
consideration paid. The study suggested that the markets response both negatively and positively 
to these three components. The first two components were significantly positively valued by the 
investors (with the going concern valued similarly to non-goodwill assets), whereas the investors 
placed a significantly negative value on the residual goodwill component, which captures the 
amount excess of the market value of the transaction. This implies companies should strive to 
allocate as many components apart from goodwill as possible instead of just assigning the excess 
consideration to goodwill.  
 
If a company does not disclose sufficient information on the residual component of goodwill, 
which, according to FFSA (2006, 2007), has been the case in Finland, the investors are likely to 
regard the excess price as an overpayment and react negatively. Allocating a larger amount to 
goodwill than the actual underlying economics suggest leads to a large amount of “unexplained” 
goodwill, which may in the light of the findings of Henning et al. (2000) offset the benefits 
originating from discretionary treatment of goodwill. 
 
Hirschey and Richardson (2002) studied the information effects “narrowly tied” to goodwill 
write-off announcements. Hirschey and Richardson (2002) found that the effects are typically 
negative and material, on the order of 2-3% of the company’s share price. Moreover, in the 
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period of one year prior to the announcement they noted negative information effects of around 
40%. During the post-announcement period the effects were on the order of 11%, which 
according to Hirschey and Richardon (2002), suggests that much, if not all, of the negative 
valuation effects stemming from goodwill write-off announcements are realized by the end of the 
announcement period. These results together with findings of Pender (2001), suggesting that 
goodwill write-offs are likely to result in dismissal of management, support the finding of Zhang 
and Zhang (2007) that older CEOs are more likely to record excess goodwill having less to lose 
in case of large impairment charges. 
 
As Henning et al. (2000) concluded, goodwill and the basis of its recognition may have a 
significant impact on earnings and further on the share price. A large amount of evidence has 
been presented that content of goodwill, impairment and amortization (with certain 
preconditions) of goodwill act as an informative signal for the investors. However, if goodwill is 
wrongfully recorded against the underlying economics, investors base their valuations of 
incorrect information, which is likely to lead to distortion in price formation.  
 
4.2 Intangible assets 
 
According to traditional accounting definition of intangible assets, intangible assets lack physical 
existency and have a high uncertainty about value (Kieso and Weygandt, 1998).  Lev and 
Zarowin (1999) found that there was a weakening association between market values and 
accounting information (earnings, cash flows and book values). They hypothesized that 
“business change” (globalization, emergence and growth of high-tech companies and thus 
intangible assets) has been the driver behind the declining usefulness of financial reports.  
 
Thus, Lev (2001), in contrast to the traditional accounting definition, takes a more modern 
approach and defines intangible assets as “non-physical resources of value generated by 
innovation and discovery, unique organizational design and human resources”. The supporters of 
the modern approach have argued that the value-relevance of traditional accounting measures has 
declined over time and the value-relevance of intangible assets is increasing along with 
advancing technology. 
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A large proportion of the surplus value paid in acquisitions consists, according to KPMG (2007), 
of intangible assets previously not recorded on the acquiree’s balance sheet. As acquisitions 
often account for a notable share of companies’ growth, this growth is, to a large extent, based on 
intangible assets. This is why it is important to examine whether the markets have correct 
information  on  intangible  assets  in  order  for  them  to  perform  more  accurate  valuations.  If  
valuations of one of the biggest growth drivers (intangible assets) are based on false information, 
it is likely to lead to inefficiencies in stock pricing. 
 
Ely and Waymire (1999) found that the investors identify the existence of economically relevant 
intangible assets based on reported earnings rather than carrying values of intangible assets in the 
balance sheet, which implies that the intangible assets previously not recorded in the acquiree’s 
balance sheet are of significance to the investors. Boone and Raman (2001), in turn, documented 
a significant association between market liquidity and off-balance sheet assets using R&D 
expenditure as a proxy, which supports the finding of Ely and Waymire (1999) and further 
highlights the importance of intangible assets in the investors’ valuations. 
 
Similarly, Ritter and Wells (2006) provided evidence of a positive association between 
voluntarily recognized and disclosed intangible assets and stock prices. Moreover, Ritter and 
Wells (2006) found there to be a positive association between identifiable intangible assets and 
realized future period income.  
 
Sriram (2008) tested whether intangible assets are relevant in assessing company’s financial 
health. Sriram (2008) found that it is crucial to include intangible assets in the model when 
evaluating companies with high proportions of intangibles. Even though Sriram (2008) found 
that the traditional financial variables still play a major role in assessing the financial health of a 
company (regardless of the asset composition and business model), excluding intangibles from 
the assessment may lead to false results. Technology companies, for example, take longer to 
develop  intangible  assets  and  even  longer  to  earn  revenues,  profits  and  ultimately  provide  the  
shareholders with adequate returns. 
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These findings imply that if an excess amount of goodwill is recorded, for example to reach a 
certain level of profitability, all the existing intangible assets are not identified and recognized in 
an appropriate manner. In the light of Sriram’s (2008) findings, this would impede and distort the 
assessment of company’s financial health. Errors in such assessment (often conducted by e.g. 
creditors or credit rating agencies) could result in differences between the actual risks and risk 
premiums. 
  
There are several categories of intangible assets as presented in table 5. To make a distinction in 
the value-relevance between different categories of intangible assets, Eccher (1998) examined 
the value-relevance of intangible assets specializing on computer software. Eccher (1998) 
documented  a  positive  association  between  stock  price  and  the  annual  amount  of  software  
capitalizations, the value of software assets and the subsequent amortization. Similarly, Eccher 
(1998) reported a positive association between the capitalization related variables and future 
earnings. Kallapur and Kwan (2000) tested whether brand values bear useful information to the 
investors and found brand values recognized in financial statements to be positively associated 
with values capitalized in stock prices and with future net income.   
 
Moehler et al. (2001) compared the informativeness of net income after taxes but before 
extraordinary items and net income after taxes but before extraordinary items excluding 
amortization of intangible assets. By regressing the market-adjusted returns on these two 
alternatives performance measures, Moehler et al. (2001) found that traditional accounting 
earnings before extraordinary items and earnings before extraordinary items excluding 
amortization were equally informative. This implies that investors value the information on the 
initial recognition of intangible assets more than the subsequent amortization.  
 
Despite the large amount of evidence presented of the value-relevance of intangible assets, 
research on the initial recognition of intangible assets in business combinations could still be 
described as exiguous. Intangible assets may play a major role in company valuations and 
assessing the financial health of companies. If they are not properly reported, it may lead to 
distortion in price formation and risk assessment, as discussed earlier in this section. 
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4.3 Purchase price allocation 
 
The concept of purchase price allocation is relatively new and it seems that it per se is not such a 
widely studied topic and a limited number of papers have been written on it. Especially, research 
under IFRS 3 is rather limited, most likely due to the young age of the guiding standard. 
However, academics, consultancies, accountancy companies and public sector supervisory 
boards have conducted a certain amount of research on purchase price allocation. The following 
paragraphs discuss prior research on purchase price allocation.  
4.3.1 Academic papers 
 
Allocating  an  excess  amount  of  the  purchase  price  to  goodwill  gives  management  a  more  
comprehensive option to exercise discretionary goodwill accounting but it can also be argued 
that it is not in the best interest of the company. Kimbrough (2007) examined the stock market 
responses to the amount of assets allocated apart from goodwill in economically significant 
business combinations. Kimbrough documented a positive association between cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the release of 10-Q or 10-K containing the first disclosures of the 
purchase price allocation and the value of the consideration paid by the acquirer. Moreover, 
Kimbrough found that the investors respond positively to the increase in the percent of the total 
assets allocated apart from goodwill as well as in the percent of the intangible assets allocated 
apart from the goodwill.  
 
Under  IFRS  goodwill  amortization  is  no  longer  allowed.  Similarly,  under  SFAS  142  (U.S.  
GAAP equivalent for IAS 38) goodwill impairments have to be carried out instead of goodwill 
amortization while most identifiable intangible assets are still amortized over their finite useful 
lives. Zhang and Zhang (2007) found evidence that managers allocate more to goodwill post-
SFAS 142 to reduce amortization expenses when they anticipate greater discretion in future 
goodwill assessments in order to avoid reporting impairment.  
 
Moreover, Zhang and Zhang (2007) found that older CEOs, who are likely to care more about 
short-term accounting earnings and bonuses, record more goodwill to avoid amortization 
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expenses. Zhang and Zhang (2007) were not able to explain the purchase price allocation prior to 
SFAS 142 using the same variables. This finding implies that the unverifiable accounting 
measures are likely to deviate from the underlying economics as a result of management 
exploiting their accounting discretion. In addition, Zhang and Zhang (2007) found that using 
external appraisers can constraint the management’s reporting opportunism to an extent but not 
eliminate it. Therefore, the possibility of use of discretion in the allocation decision driven by 
incentives to manage earnings must also be examined using Finnish data.  
  
Rantsi (2007), in his master’s thesis, studied the effect of characteristics of the acquiring 
company on purchase price allocation in Helsinki Stock Exchange using 2005 financial 
statements. He found evidence that the acquirer’s growth prospects correlate positively with 
proportionate allocation to goodwill. This finding seems to contradict with theory of nature of 
growth firms’ goodwill (e.g. Ojala, 2001) suggesting that growth firms carry less goodwill than 
others. He also found a positive association between R&D activity and proportionate allocation 
to intangible assets and a negative association between leverage and proportionate allocation to 
goodwill.  
 
However, Rantsi (2007) omitted the possibility that management’s personal incentives may 
directly affect the allocation decision as evidenced by Zhang and Zhang (2007). This paper 
caters for the possible impact of the characteristics of the management. Moreover, Rantsi (2007) 
concentrated more on the general company attributes impacting the allocation decision (i.e. deal 
characteristics) instead of examining the possibility of discretionary accounting.  
 
Rantsi (2007) also carried out a survey mapping out the CEOs’/CFOs’ views on IFRS 3 in 
companies listed in OMX Helsinki. Most of the respondents of the survey thought that intangible 
assets cannot be reliably measured and found brands and trademarks to be the most difficult to 
value. 40 % of the respondents disagreed that intangible assets are valued only for accounting 
purposes, which means that many companies believe that intangible asset valuation affects the 
purchase price and thus bear useful information to investors. This is in line with findings of 
Kimbrough (2007) suggesting that there is a positive association between abnormal returns and 
the percentage of intangible assets allocated apart from goodwill. 
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4.3.2 Historical quality of purchase price allocation 
 
In 2006, Financial Supervision of Finland (FFSA) released a study on IFRS Financial Statements 
of Finnish listed companies for financial year 2005. As a part of that study, FFSA (2006) dealt 
with purchase price allocation. The sample consisted of 39 listed companies that made 
acquisitions in 2005. FFSA (2006) found that the proportion of goodwill of the purchase price 
was significant in most business combinations. The proportional share of goodwill (totaling 
nearly €2 billion) of the total cost of combinations (€4.5 billion) was also significant, totaling 
44%.  
 
The pre-acquisition book value of all business combination covered 36% of the total cost                                                                               
of combinations. 43 % of the cost of combinations exceeding the pre-acquisition carrying 
amounts  (book  values)  was  allocated  to  intangible  assets  and  the  total  share  of  fair  value  
allocations was 25%. However, according to FFSA (2006), the proportion of intangible assets 
cannot be regarded as large; in almost 50% of the combinations the share of intangible assets was 
less than 10% or intangible assets were not recognized at all. FFSA (2006) found this 
information surprising, as according to them, for example customer relationships, trademarks and 
technology are often the main drivers for acquisitions and they are usually not recognized in the 
acquiree’s balance sheet.  
 
FFSA (2006) also found the notes disclosed on the business combinations insufficient. FFSA 
(2006) found the disclosures on acquiree, acquisition date, percentage of acquired control and 
assets and liabilities recognized fairly comprehensive. On the contrary, barely any factors 
affecting the cost of combination were disclosed. Over half of the companies generally referred 
to “future synergy benefits” or did not refer to any factors that had an impact on the 
measurement of goodwill. A general reference to “synergy benefits” does not meet the 
requirements of IFRS 3 unless more detailed information on the subject is disclosed. Only one of 
the companies disclosed information on monetary value of the future synergy benefits (FFSA, 
2006). 
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In 2007, FFSA studied the Finnish listed companies IFRS financial statements for fiscal year 
2006 to find out, if any improvements in the application of IFRS could be detected. The total 
value of cost of combinations in Finnish listed companies increased from €4.5 billion in 2005 to 
€4.7 billion in 2006. The amount of goodwill in proportion to the total value of business 
combinations had declined from 41% in 2005 to 25% in 2006. In 2006, the pre-acquisition 
carrying value of the acquirees’ assets of the total cost of combination was 42% (36% in 2005). 
Only 17% of the cost exceeding the carrying amounts was allocated to intangible assets, but it 
was in line with FFSA (2006) finding of 2005 that in individual cases the percentage of the 
allocation was no more than 10%. On the other hand, the total fair value allocations had 
increased from 25% to 33%. According to FFSA (2007), the quality of reporting had improved 
from 2005 to 2006 as companies had familiarized themselves with the requirements of IFRS. 
Thus, it can be argued that companies have become more aware of the (discretionary accounting) 
possibilities related to purchase price allocation and that the awareness has increased further in 
2007 financial statements. 
 
Intangible Business (2007), a brand valuation consultancy, conducted a research on purchase 
price allocation under IFRS 3 for the first year of reporting (2005 or 2006) for major FTSE 100 
companies. They examined total 88 companies reporting under IFRS 3. The total reported deal 
value for those companies for the selected periods was £40 billion.  
 
Intangible Business (2007) noted that the “spirit of IFRS 3” was not being followed and nor were 
the specific rules of IFRS 3. Intangible Business found the shortcomings so significant that they 
concluded that the adoption of IFRS 3 had not remarkably improved the transparency of business 
combinations. They found that intangible assets had been reported at undervalues, whereas 
goodwill had correspondingly been reported at overvalues. The share of the acquisition value 
allocated  to  intangible  assets  was  only  30%,  which  the  authors  found  too  low  based  on  their  
experience in purchase price allocation. Goodwill, again, constituted over a half (53%) of the 
deal values, which Intangible Business (2007) found to be too high considering that the key 
purpose of IFRS 3 is to identify and value all the purchased assets. (Intangible Business, 2007) 
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IFRS 3 states the following about goodwill disclosures: 
 
“ A description of the factors that contributed to a cost that results in the recognition of goodwill 
– a description of each intangible asset that was not recognized separately from goodwill and an 
explanation of why the intangible asset’s fair value could not be measured reliably – or a 
description of the nature of the excess recognized in profit or loss.”. IFRS 3 66(h) 
 
In spite of this, the entities did not report notes describing the factors making up goodwill even 
though, according to Intangible Business (2007), this should be possible to accomplish. 
Intangible Business (2007) reckons that the above-mentioned results in an “accounting black 
hole” of £21 billion that is wrongly reported as goodwill. Intangible Business (2007) found the 
non-compliance rather notable considering the remarkable pile of cash that was spent on 
acquisitions.  
 
In addition, the study revealed that the level of disclosures about acquired intangible assets was 
patchy and inconsistent. Many of the companies did not describe the acquired intangible assets 
as suggested by IFRS 3. The majority of the reported intangible assets fell into “mixed” 
category, which was either a combination of other classifications or was described on a general 
level (for instance, “other intangibles”). According to the authors, this “mixed” category offers 
very little transparence in the accounts. These findings are in line with the findings of FFSA 
(2006, 2007). Possible implications of these findings for this paper are discussed later on. 
 
The lack of disclosures hamper the investors’ analysis and assessment if the acquisition has 
generated any value for the company and makes it difficult, if not possible, to see if the 
acquisition is performing well (Intangible Business, 2007). Similarly, even if the disclosures 
were extensive but the actual allocations did not correspond to the underlying economics, 
investors’ analysis and assessment regarding the value added by the acquisitions are seriously 
impeded. 
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The low quality of the disclosures Intangible Business (2007) attributes to the following: 
 
a) Companies can increase reported profits through reduced amortization. Intangible assets 
need to be amortized and the respective charges made to profits, if the assets have a finite 
useful life. As goodwill cannot be amortized, minimizing the values of intangible assets 
and maximizing the goodwill means that the amortization charges are likely to be 
reduced. 
b) Acquired intangible assets need to be valued and tested for impairment individually. 
Goodwill only needs to be tested for impairment together with the goodwill for the rest of 
the associated cash generating unit. As such goodwill is not revalued it might be recorded 
at much less than its current value. This results in headroom for impairment test, reducing 
the risk of having to recognize impairment charges. 
 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, (PwC 2004) prior to application of the purchase method, 
in majority of business combinations the purchase price exceeding the fair value of tangible 
assets of the acquiree has been fully recorded as goodwill instead of valuing the acquired assets 
and assumed liabilities at the fair value. As a reason for this, according to PwC (2004), many 
companies present that measuring and controlling the intangible assets is rather difficult.  
 
c) Lack of  specialist  skills  to  implement  IFRS 3.  Lack  of  knowledge  or  confidence  might  
have led to such a low level of disclosures. The valuation of intangible assets for business 
combinations requires specialist skills which can be difficult to find. 
 
d) It is possible that the detailed processes and regulations have resulted in an insufficient 
standing back from the detail to assess overall what the acquisition was about, what were 
the justifications and what the reporting standard is trying to achieve.  
 
The historical low quality of IFRS 3 reporting and purchase price allocation has practical 
implications also for this paper. Even though the acquired entity has identifiable intangible assets 
previously not recognized in the acquiree’s balance sheet, they may not be identified and 
recognized in the process of business combination accounting. This might lead to a larger 
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proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill than the underlying situation would 
actually  require.  However,  in  the  absence  of  additional  goodwill  disclosures,  it  cannot  be  
confirmed whether a large proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill is a 
consequence of neglecting the allocation process or using the allocation decision to manage 
earnings. It might also be that there are no intangible assets to be identified and the excess 
purchase price consists in full of genuine goodwill. This implies that allocation to goodwill and 
intangible assets does not represent a straight trade-off. Therefore, a reversed inspection 
discussed in section 1.1 is also necessary. 
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5. Hypotheses development 
5.1 Hypotheses background 
 
Accounting for business combinations under IFRS 3 is not voluntary for companies required to 
apply IFRS. However, transition from Finnish GAAP has, according to FFSA (2006), proven 
problematic and time-consuming. For practical reasons, FFSA has, to an extent, overlooked the 
deficient IFRS-reporting during the transition period. Therefore, allocation of the purchase price 
for the sample companies in 2007 can be perceived in a sense as subtly discretionary as FFSA 
has not imposed sanctions (only guiding critique) on companies not following the guidance of 
IFRS 3 to the fullest and allocating all identifiable assets apart from goodwill. This implicates 
that discretion may be used in the allocation decision as an excessive allocation to goodwill has 
not induced punitive measures by FFSA. Consequently, companies that lack accounting 
resources for duly conducting a time-consuming and resource binding process of identifying and 
valuing the purchased intangible assets may just against the spirit of IFRS 3 allocate the excess 
price in full to goodwill. 
 
The first three hypotheses aim to find evidence that the discretion related to the allocation 
decision is used driven by incentives to manage earnings, i.e. evidence that certain acquirer 
characteristics make the allocation deviate from the underlying economics as a result of earnings 
management.  The  fourth  hypothesis  acts  as  a  reversed  inspection  for  such  discretionary  
accounting. The purpose of the fifth hypothesis, in turn, is to find evidence of impact of 
discretionary accounting, driven by factors other than earnings management, on the allocation 
decision. 
 
5.2 Use of the allocation decision as an earnings management tool 
 
Zhang and Zhang (2007) found evidence that managers use the allocation decision as an earnings 
management tool. Assuming that allocating the purchase price is the management’s decision, 
they found that older CEOs, who are likely to care more about short-term accounting earnings 
and bonuses bound to those earnings, record more goodwill to avoid amortization expenses. 
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According to Zhang and Zhang (2007), older CEOs are likely have stronger incentives to boost 
up short-term earnings due to their weakened career concerns. Older CEOs are likely to lose less 
if the misallocation of the purchase price is discovered or the misallocation leads to goodwill 
impairment in the future. Prior research argues that CEOs close to the end of their tenure focus 
more on short-term earnings rather than long-term performance to maximize their compensation 
prior to retiring. Evidence of such behavior has been presented e.g. by Dechow and Sloan (1991) 
and Brickley et al. (1999).  
 
The study of Zhang and Zhang (2007) was carried out under US GAAP but it can be assumed 
that there are no institutional factors that would prevent the allocation decision from being 
similarly used as an earnings management tool also in Finland. Thus, 
 
H1. There is a positive association between the age of the CEO and allocation to goodwill.  
 
According to earnings smoothing theory, management strives to increase earnings in years of bad 
performance and, in turn, decrease earnings in years of good performance. Gaver et al. (1995) 
and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) found evidence of earnings management consistent with 
income smoothing. Such behavior would make sense for managers, whose bonus incentives 
depend on meeting certain targets for earnings. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), especially, report 
that companies avoid negative earnings. They present evidence that distribution of earnings is 
“bunched” just above zero. Degeorge et al. (1999) presented evidence that the distribution of 
earnings is “bunched” also at other levels, not just above zero. According to Degeorge et al. 
(1999) earnings are bunched also above the level of earnings to have stable or growing earnings 
and above analyst’ forecasts.  
 
Allocating a larger proportion to goodwill requires more goodwill impairments in the future (to 
“deflate” the recorded goodwill) but the absence of tangible assets depreciations and intangible 
asset amortizations would make the current reporting period look better. Thus, the second 
hypothesis: 
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H2. There is a negative association between the acquirer’s profitability and allocation to 
goodwill.   
 
According to Ojala (2001), there is a limited period of time during which a growth company can 
utilize the purchased goodwill due to the rapidly changing business environment. Ojala (2001) 
argues that if the goodwill is not exploited without delay it will lose its value. This implies that 
either the goodwill is more rapidly impaired or less goodwill is initially recognized. 
   
Signaling theory suggests that management strives to decrease the information asymmetry 
between agent and principal (e.g. Cheng and Coulombe, 1996). According to signaling, investors 
are assumed to response to the change from initial reporting strategy to more aggressive 
expensing positively and, consequently, value the company upwards, which may result in 
management bonuses. More rapid expensing in connection with the initial goodwill recognition 
means that the amount allocated to goodwill is minimized.  
 
According to the theories presented above, it would be in a growth company’s (and its 
management’s) best interest to record as little goodwill as possible (e.g. by overvaluation of 
intangible assets). Thus, 
 
H3. There is a negative association between the acquirer’s growth prospects and allocation 
to goodwill. 
 
The industry, in which a company operates, is argued to have an impact on the vulnerability of 
the company. Also, proprietary costs vary by industry. Companies operating in different 
industries face different characteristics of market competition, the type of private information 
and also the threat of new companies entering into the market (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Companies that operate in technology, media and telecom industries are likely to have more 
sensitive private information due to the high level of intangible assets utilized in their operations 
(Collins et al., 1997). This suggests that the disclosures on the acquired intangible assets would 
make the acquirer more vulnerable to competition. Therefore, in order to keep their sensitive 
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information a secret, these companies may minimize the amount of intangible assets recognized 
apart from goodwill. 
 
On the other hand, signaling suggests that deviating from corporate reporting practice that has 
been established may be regarded as bad news by the markets (Giner, 1997), which implies that 
withholding information from investors could have a negative impact on the share price. 
Therefore, it would be in the company’s best interest not to withhold information. Furthermore, 
allocation to intangible assets per se does not itself reveal sensitive information in the absence of 
detailed verbal disclosures. 
 
According to Collins et al. (1997) and Lev and Zarowin (1999) more investments in intangible 
assets are made in high-tech industries. Because acquisitions often take place within an industry, 
it can be assumed that companies operating in high-tech industries allocate a larger proportion of 
the purchase price to other intangible assets than companies operating in other industries (even 
though the acquired intangible assets may not always be recognized as assets, e.g. employees’ 
competence can been regarded as an asset but must be recognized as goodwill).  
 
Therefore, the fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4. Companies operating in Technology, Media and Telecom sector allocate a larger 
proportion of the purchase price to intangible assets than companies operating in other 
sectors. 
 
5.3 Impact of resources and political costs on the allocation decision 
 
As discussed in section 3.1.3, there are many challenges related to determination of the fair 
values of intangible assets that require special skills and knowledge. Buzby (1975) and Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) found that the cost of accumulating and disseminating detailed financial 
information is relatively higher for smaller companies than for bigger ones. Also, according to 
Depoers (2000), large companies tend to employ highly skilled individuals and management 
reporting systems that are capable of providing more comprehensive corporate information, 
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which suggest that it is more lucrative for larger companies to conduct a thorough allocation of 
the purchase price and identify and recognize more intangible assets apart from goodwill.  
 
Moreover, larger firms are under closer scrutiny by government agencies and thus more exposed 
to political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). These 
companies believe that the pressure of the unwelcome scrutiny will ease along with better 
reporting (Buzby, 1975). Therefore, the fifth hypothesis: 
 
H5. There is a negative association between the acquirer’s size and allocation to goodwill.   
 
Zhang and Zhang (2007) assumed the length of the CEO’s tenure to be positively correlated with 
the age of the CEO and included it to their study to better capture the explanatory power of 
CEO’s characteristics on goodwill allocation. Zhang and Zhang (2007) found the length of the 
CEO’s tenure to be negatively correlated with allocation to goodwill. Therefore, the length of the 
CEO’s tenure is used as a control variable in this paper. Furthermore, Rantsi (2007) found there 
to be a positive association between company’s R&D activity and proportionate allocation to 
intangible assets and a negative association between leverage and proportionate allocation to 
goodwill and a positive association between leverage and allocation to other net assets. 
Therefore, these variables are also included as control variables.  
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6. Research methodology 
6.1 Data description  
 
The data for the dependent variables was extracted from 2007 financial statements of companies 
listed  in  OMX  Helsinki  reporting  acquisitions.  The  data  for  the  explanatory  variables  was  
gathered from Bloomberg database and supplemented by manually extracting the missing data 
from the financial statements. The cases where no acquisitions were reported for fiscal year 2007 
were double-checked in Mergermarket database. 
 
61 of 129 (47%) of companies listed in OMX Helsinki as at 31 December 2007 reported at least 
one  acquisition,  i.e.  disclosed  information  on  the  allocation  of  the  purchase  price.  The  overall  
number of deals disclosed by the 61 companies was over 200 (the exact number is not known 
since many companies presented aggregate information on smaller deals without disclosing the 
number of deals included in the aggregate figures). However, the number of aggregated deals 
was not significant.   
 
The overall purchase price of the acquisitions of the 61 companies in 2007 was € 10.16 billion. 
The average individual purchase price was € 118.11 million and median 10.70 million. The mean 
value lies far above the median value, which shows that even though some large scale deals were 
included in the sample, the overall deal value was small. The value of the smallest deal included 
in the sample is unknown due to the aggregation of information and absence of the related 
additional disclosures that would include specifications of the deal values. The value of the 
smallest individually reported deal was € 320 thousand. In contrast, the largest deal included in 
the sample was the transaction between Nokia and Siemens to form Nokia Siemens Networks, 
the acquisition cost of which reported by Nokia was € 5.5 billion.  
 
The overall purchase price, € 10.16 billion, comprised of goodwill arising from the acquisitions € 
3.54 (34.8%) billion, intangible assets not previously recorded in the acquiree’s balance sheet € 
3.09 (30.4%) billion and other net assets € 3.53 billion (34.8%). Both goodwill and intangible 
assets form a remarkable part of the purchase price, which highlights the importance of proper 
goodwill and intangible asset accounting in baring the drivers behind the acquisition. Of the 
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companies reporting at least one acquisition, 54 (89%) companies reported goodwill and 43 
(71%) intangible assets, which shows that goodwill and intangible assets were present in the 
majority of the deals.   
 
Table 1. Classification of sample companies by industry. 
This table presents the distribution of the sample companies by industry as well as the number of companies reporting intangible 
assets and goodwill. The classification is based on Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) on the sector level. However, 
sectors have been combined into five categories. 
Industry
Number of 
companies in the 
industry
%
Number of companies 
reporting intangible 
assets
% Number of companies reporting goodwill %
Other consumer or industrial products 34 56 % 25 74 % 31 91 %
Technology, media & telecom 17 28 % 13 76 % 17 100 %
Financial 7 11 % 3 43 % 4 57 %
Healthcare 2 3 % 2 100 % 2 100 %
Utilities 1 2 % 0 0 % 0 0 %
Total 61 100 % 43 70 % 54 89 %
 
Table 1 describes the classification of the sample companies and proportions of the companies 
reporting intangible assets and goodwill. 76 % of the companies operating in the technology, 
media and telecom (TMT) industry reported intangible assets in their purchase price allocation 
disclosures. This is not surprising as TMT is an intangible asset intensive industry (Collins et al., 
1997, Lev and Zarowin, 1999). The respective figure for companies operating in other consumer 
or products (CIP) industry is almost as high (74%). The high percentage in CIP is interesting and 
implies that intangible assets are not important only to TMT companies.  
 
Only 43% of the companies in the financial services industry (FIN) reported intangible assets. 
This is also logical since the financial services industry is not regarded as an intangible asset 
intensive industry. However, the sample includes only seven companies operating in FIN and 
does not necessarily give an accurate enough picture of the actual state of affairs. Neither 
healthcare nor utilities companies are extensively represented in the sample, and, therefore, 
conclusions should be drawn with caution.  
 
Purchase price allocation by industry is discussed in more detail in section 7. 
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6.2 Variable measurement and research design 
6.2.1 Dependent variables 
 
The dependent variables used in this paper are calculated similarly to Zhang and Zhang (2007) 
and are as follows: 
 
1) GOODWILL = Allocation to goodwill.  
 
To capture the discretion related to allocation of goodwill, allocation to goodwill is calculated as 
the amount allocated to goodwill as a percentage of the combined amount allocated to all 
intangible assets, including both goodwill and other intangible assets.  
 
2) OTHERINTANGIBLES = Allocation to other intangible assets.  
 
Allocation to other intangible assets is calculated as the percentage of the purchase price 
allocated to other intangible assets. 
 
3) OTHERNETASSETS = Allocation to other net assets.  
 
Allocation to other net assets is calculated as the percentage of the purchase price allocated to 
other net assets (purchase price deducted by goodwill and other intangible assets). 
6.2.2 Explanatory variables 
 
The explanatory variables employed are as follows: 
 
4) CEOAGE The end of the fiscal period 2007  CEO date of birth ? ?  
 
CEO age is the age of the CEO of the acquiring company at the end of the fiscal period. 
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5)  CEOTENURE The end of fiscal period 2007  the date the CEO took office? ?  
 
Equity6) LEVERAGE  2006 2007 year-end average of 1
Total assets
? ? ?
 
 
Leverage is calculated as the average leverage of 2007, i.e. the average of leverage in the 
beginning and at the end of the fiscal period 2007. The average is used in order to better reflect 
the average situation during the fiscal period. 
 
? ? ? ?? ?
Earnings before interests and taxes 2007
7) PROFITABILITY  Return on assets ROA  
Total assets 2007
? ?
 
 
R & D expenses8)  RDTONETSALES average of 2005 2007 
Net sales
? ?
 
 
Intangible assets resulting from research and development activity often take longer than a year 
to develop. Therefore, to proxy for R&D activity the average of 2005-2007 R&D costs divided 
by net sales is used. 
 
? ?
? ?
Market capitalization 2007
9)  PRICETOBOOK 
Equity 2007
?
 
 
To proxy the acquirer’s growth prospects, price-to-book ratio is used. 
? ?? ?10)  LNMCAP  ln Market capitalization 2007?  
 
To  proxy  the  company’s  size,  either  market  capitalization,  total  assets,  net  sales  or  number  of  
employees are often used. Total assets and net sales are, however, used to build other proxies and 
could create multicollinearity. Therefore, to proxy the acquirer’s size, the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization is employed.  
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11) CIP – Equals 1 if the company operates in other consumer or industrial product industry. 
Otherwise, equals 0. 
 
12) TMT - Equals 1 if the company operates in technology, media and telecom industry. 
Otherwise, equals 0. 
 
The sample of Zhang and Zhang (2007) included data only in one industry. Zhang and Zhang 
(2007) argued that purchase price allocations are likely to be affected by the underlying 
economics of the target companies and having a homogeneous sample in terms of the industry 
reduces the possibility that the results are driven by differences in operating environments. Due 
to the limited number of companies listed in OMX Helsinki it would not be sensible to examine 
allocations in only one industry as it would result in a rather small sample size.  
 
Therefore, two dummy variables are employed as a proxy for the two biggest industry groups 
represented in OMX Helsinki. Rantsi (2007) found companies operating in TMT to allocate 
proportionately more to goodwill than companies operating in other industries. Moreover, CIP 
can be argued to be less intangible asset intensive and thus a dummy variable for CIP is 
employed in order to find out whether a reversed effect compared to TMT can be documented. 
 
Companies operating in the financial services industry have significantly different financial 
characteristics (e.g. leverage ratio and profitability) than other companies and, therefore, 
financial service companies are not included in the multivariate analysis since financial 
characteristics are used as explanatory variables. The sample includes only a few companies 
operating in other industries and, therefore, separate dummy variables are not employed for 
them.  
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6.2.3 Multivariate regression analysis  
 
Hypotheses 1-3 and 5 are tested by estimating the coefficients in the four multivariate models 
presented below. The estimations are conducted by employing ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. Hypothesis 4 is tested by employing Student’s two-tailed t-test. 
 
The first model includes variables that, based on theory and prior research, bear strong 
expectations related to their explanatory power regarding goodwill. Therefore, the first model as 
whole bears the highest expectations regarding the explanatory power in allocation to goodwill.  
 
In the second model, all the explanatory variables are included, in the third model 
RDTONETSALES is removed, in the fourth model RDTONETSALES is added back and 
PROFITABILITY is removed. The switch between PROFITABILITY and RDTONETSALES is 
conducted due to strong correlation between the two variables. Multicollinearity is further 
discussed in section 7.1.3. 
 
Research on factors impacting allocation to goodwill can be described as rather limited. 
Therefore, regressions using all four models are run in order to elaborate the examination and to 
see if any peculiar or interesting findings can be made. However, there are no strong 
expectations related to models 2-4.  
 
Model 1, 
 
0 1 2 3GOODWILL LNMCAP PRICETOBOOK PROFITABILITY? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  
54CEOAGE CEOTENURE? ? ?? ?  
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Model 2, 
 
0 1 2 3GOODWILL LNMCAP PRICETOBOOK PROFITABILITY? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  
5 74 6CEOAGE CEOTENURE LEVERAGE RDTONETSALES? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  
8 9TMT CIP? ? ?? ?  
 
Model 3, 
 
0 1 2 3GOODWILL LNMCAP PRICETOBOOK PROFITABILITY? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  
54 6 8 9CEOAGE CEOTENURE LEVERAGE TMT CIP? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  
 
Model 4, 
 
0 1 2 4GOODWILL LNMCAP PRICETOBOOK CEOAGE? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  
5 76 8 9CEOTENURE LEVERAGE RDTONETSALES TMT CIP? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  
 
To test the impact of acquirer’s characteristics on purchase price allocation to other intangible 
assets, i.e. to conduct a reversed inspection as discussed in 1.1, the models presented above are 
employed with the exception of replacing GOODWILL with OTHERINTANGIBLES (models 
5-8).   
 
Similarly, to test the impact of acquirer’s characteristics on purchase price allocation to other net 
assets, i.e. to illustrate the role of the verifiability of the assets in purchase price allocation, 
allocation to OTHERNETASSETS is examined by employing the same four models as in 
examination of allocation to GOODWILL. Thus, GOODWILL is replaced with 
OTHERNETASSETS (models 9-12).  The predicted signs of the coefficients in models 1-4, 5-8 
and 9-12 are presented in tables 8, 10 and 11, respectively.  
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7. Results  
7.1 Examination of violation of OLS assumptions 
7.1.1 Normality of residuals 
 
One  of  the  main  assumptions  of  the  OLS  regression  is  that  the  residuals  follow  a  normal  
distribution.  Normality  of  residuals  is  required  for  statistical  tests  to  be  valid  (p,  t  and  F).  
Therefore,  the  normality  of  residuals  of  one  model  in  each  of  the  model  groups  (allocation  to  
goodwill, other intangible assets and other net assets) is tested by employing a graphical test, 
where normal probability plots for the residuals are produced and plotted against a theoretical 
normal distribution. The output of the test can be found in appendix 1.  
 
The  visual  examination  does  not  show significant  departures  from the  line  (i.e.  normality)  and  
gives  no  reason  to  assume that  the  residuals  are  not  normally  distributed.  According  to  Mellin  
(2006), even though mild deviation from the normality emerges, the results of the regression are 
still fairly reliable in terms of p, t and F-values. It can also be assumed that the distributions of 
residuals of other models in the group do not significantly differ from the residual distributions 
of the test models presented in appendix 1 (models 1, 5, and 9). 
7.1.2 Homoskedasticity of residuals 
 
Another main assumption of the OLS regression is the homogeneity of variance of the residuals. 
When the variance of the residuals varies across observations, residuals are said to be 
heteroskedastic. If the residuals are heteroskedastic, the OLS estimator remains unbiased but 
becomes inefficient. According to Long and Ervin (2000), when heteroskedasticity is mild, OLS 
standard errors behave quite well. However, when severe heteroskedasticity is present, it may 
bias standard errors. This in turn leads to bias in test statistics and confidence intervals.  
 
Therefore, an initial test for heteroskedasticity is conducted by performing a visual inspection of 
residuals plotted against fitted values for each model group to determine, whether further tests for 
heteroskedasticity are needed. The output of the test can be found in appendix 2. None of the visual 
  
46 
tests showed a distinct pattern that would indicate presence of severe heteroskedasticity. However, a 
slight indication of heteroskedasticity can be detected in GOODWILL and OTHERNETASSETS. To 
further examine the possible presence of heteroskedasticity, White’s test was employed. The p-values 
ranged from 0.22 to 0.52, which gives no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of White’s test stating 
that the variances are homogenous in all of the models.  
7.1.3 Examination of multicollinearity 
 
In multicollinearity, two or more dependent variables are highly correlated. Even though it does 
not  affect  the  reliability  or  predictive  power  of  the  model  as  a  whole,  multicollinearity  could  
result in defective calculations regarding individual variables. To examine whether 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables exists, pairwise Pearson’s correlations are 
calculated for the variables. The outcome of the calculations is presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2. Pairwise Pearson’s correlations between dependent and continuous explanatory variables. 
This table presents pairwise Pearson's correlations between dependent and continuous explanatory variables employed in  the 
OLS regression. Statistically significant correlation at 1 % and 5% significance level is indicated by *** and **, respectively.  
(N=54) 
 
Variable GW OTINT OTNET LNMCAP PRICE PROF CEOAGE CEOTEN LEVER RD
GOODWILL 1.00
OTHERINTANGIBLES -0.57*** 1.00
OTHERNETASSETS -0.15 -0.64*** 1.00
LNMCAP -0.21 0.00 0.14 1.00
PRICETOBOOK -0.03 0.07 -0.06 0.41*** 1.00
PROFITABILITY 0.30** -0.50*** 0.33*** 0.21 0.25 1.00
CEOAGE -0.02 -0.10 0.11 0.38*** 0.21 0.10 1.00
CEOTENURE -0.02 -0.25 0.28** -0.10 0.04 0.13 0.28** 1.00
LEVERAGE -0.05 -0.23 0.23 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.38*** 1.00
RDTONETSALES -0.22 0.54*** -0.38*** -0.17 -0.08 -0.76*** -0.21 -0.16 -0.38*** 1.00
 
 
The table shows that 11 pairs of variables have statistically significant correlation at 1 % level. 
Two of the pairs are formed by two dependent variables. OTHERINTANGIBLES and 
GOODWILL are negatively correlated, which is logical since more allocation to 
OTHERINTANGIBLES often means less allocation to goodwill. Even though there is no 
straight  trade-off  between  allocation  to  goodwill  and  other  intangible  assets,  based  on  the  
negative correlation it can be assumed that the models explaining allocation to goodwill can also 
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be used to explain allocation to other intangible assets with expectations of somewhat reversed 
results and additional findings related to the variables not included in model 1. 
 
Moreover, OTHERNETASSETS correlates negatively with OTHERINTANGIBLES, which is 
also logical since the more of the purchase price consists of other net assets, the less is left for 
intangible assets.  
 
As regards to hypotheses 1, 3 and 5, no statistically significant pairwise correlation between any 
of the explanatory variables and allocation to goodwill is found at 1% or 5% level. CEOAGE is 
negatively correlated with GOODWILL, which is in contradiction with H1 and findings of 
Zhang and Zhang (2007). PROFITABILITY has a statistically significant correlation with 
GOODWILL at 5% level but the sign is in contradiction with the underlying hypothesis. 
PRICETOBOOK, instead, has a negative sign as expected. In addition, LNMCAP is negatively 
correlated with GOODWILL as assumed in H5.  
 
Six of the pairs with statistically significant correlation are formed by a dependent variable and 
an explanatory variable. OTHERINTANGIBLES correlates negatively with PROFITABILITY 
and positively with RDTONETSALES. Similarly, OTHERNETASSETS correlates negatively 
with RDTONETSALES and positively with PROFITABILITY and CEOTENURE. These 
findings give a reason to expect similar findings in the multivariate analysis. 
 
Five pairs include two explanatory variables, which are the focus area in examination of 
multicollinearity. LNMCAP has statistically significant correlation with PRICETOBOOK (0.41) 
and CEOAGE (0.38) at 1% significance level. RDTONETSALES has statistically significant 
correlation with PROFITABILITY (-0.76) and LEVERAGE (-0.38) at 1% significance level. In 
addition, LEVERAGE correlates with CEOTENURE (0.38) at 1% significance level and 
CEOAGE with CEOTENURE (0.28) at 5% significance level. Correlation between explanatory 
variables may deteriorate the overall model fit and lead to weakening of multivariate test results.  
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To further investigate if harmful multicollinearity is present, VIF (Variance Inflator Factor)-
values are calculated for the continuous variables. Table 3 shows the outcome of VIF-
calculations. 
 
Table 3. Variance Inflator Factors for continuous explanatory variables. 
VIF 1/VIF
RDTONETSALES 3.31 0.302
PROFITABILITY 3.01 0.332
LEVERAGE 1.56 0.642
LNMCAP 1.49 0.673
CEOTENURE 1.39 0.717
CEOAGE 1.39 0.721
PRICETOBOOK 1.38 0.725
Mean VIF 1.93
 
 
A VIF-factor of over 10 is usually considered a sign of presence of harmful multicollinearity. 
However, there is no one clear indicator of multicollinearity and it must be dealt with case by 
case. None of the variables gets a VIF-value over 10, the highest values being 3.31 
(RDTONETSALES) and 3.01 (PROFITABILITY). The inverse of VIF indicates that 30% of 
variance in RDTONETSALES is not explained by other explanatory variables and 33% of 
variance in PROFITABILITY is not explained by other explanatory variables. Other variables 
get notably lower VIF-values and, consequently, higher 1/VIF-values.  
 
The explanation for the (negative) correlation between PROFITABILITY and 
RDTONETSALES could be that companies that have already reached a certain level of 
profitability do not feel the need to engage in extensive R&D activities, whereas companies with 
lower level of profitability strive to reach a higher profitability level by means of investing in 
R&D, which could result in e.g. new technology that could be used to lower production costs. 
 
To avoid the possible problems caused by the correlation between the explanatory variables, one 
of the variables could be left out of the regression at a time. This would remove the problem to 
an extent, but removing variables from the model could cause deterioration in the explanatory 
power of the model as a whole (correlated omitted variable problem). It would be justified to 
leave out one of the variables without further actions if the variables measured the same thing 
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(e.g. net sales vs. market capitalization as a measure of company size) or did not have underlying 
theories supporting their possible impact on the model but this is not the case. Therefore, 
separate regression are run with both variables included in the first run and one of the correlating 
variables excluded at a time in the next two runs. 
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics on the variables included in the multivariate regression analysis are 
presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Lower quartile Median Higher quartile
GOODWILL 0.61 0.32 0.33 0.69 0.89
OTHERINTANGIBLES 0.27 0.30 0.00 0.21 0.34
OTHERNETASSETS 0.27 0.38 0.06 0.23 0.50
LNMCAP 6.06 2.09 4.51 6.24 7.46
PRICETOBOOK 2.55 1.50 1.49 2.27 3.27
PROFITABILITY 0.08 0.19 0.05 0.09 0.15
CEOAGE 50.93 5.89 47.00 51.00 62.00
CEOTENURE 4.54 3.95 1.58 3.92 7.00
LEVERAGE 0.53 0.13 0.44 0.55 0.62
RDTONETSALES 2.80 7.20 0.00 0.64 2.12
CIP 0.63 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
TMT 0.31 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Observations = 54
 
 
Most  of  the  variables’  means  are  close  to  their  medians,  which  indicates  that  most  of  the  
variables are not significantly skewed. However, it is notable that the mean value of 
RDTONETSALES is way above the median indicating that certain companies’ research and 
development expenses in relation to their net sales are a lot higher than in most companies. 
Lower  quartile  value  0  indicates  that  at  least  25%  of  the  sample  companies  did  not  have  any  
R&D expenses in 2007. The variation is not surprising, since the data includes companies 
operating in completely different industries.  
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The mean age of the CEO is 50.93 years and the median 51 years. It seems that it takes tens of 
years of experience to get a hold of a CEO position in a listed company in Finland. Moreover, in 
Finland,  a  common  retirement  age  is  between  60-65,  which  means  that  majority  of  the  CEOs  
included in this paper are not close to retiring, which could vitiate the explanatory power of CEO 
age in earnings management since it was based on the closeness of retirement. On the other hand, 
the average CEO age in the study of Zhang and Zhang (2007) was 52.7 and the median 52, 
which are quite close to the values of this paper. Also, the retirement age in the United States is 
close to that of Finland’s. Therefore, this gives no reason to believe that the age distribution of 
CEOs would undermine the results. On the other hand, the average tenure of a CEO is 4.54 years 
(Zhang and Zhang (2007) 6.3) and mean 3.92 (5) implying that CEO’s in Finland have shorter 
tenures on average. 
 
In addition, PRICETOBOOK mean value is 2.55 (median 2.27), indicating that the market 
values of the majority of the sample companies significantly exceed their book values (lower 
quartile being 1.49).  According to Deloitte (2007), the market value of a company exceeding its 
book value can be largely ascribed to intangible assets. 
 
7.3 Descriptive results 
 
Table 5 presents the classification of intangible assets used in this paper. The classification has 
five categories and is very similar to that of Deloitte (2007). 
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Table 5. Classification of intangible assets in this paper. 
Intangible asset category Examples include
Customer related Customer lists, order or production backlogs, customer contracts and 
customer relationships including non-contractual relationships.
Technology-based
Patented technology, computer software, unpatented technology (know-
how), databases, trade secrets such as secret formulas, processes and 
recipes.
Marketing related Trademarks, trade names, service marks, newspaper mastheads, internet 
domain names, non-competition agreements.
Contract-based
Licensing and royalty agreements, advertising, construction, service or 
supply agreements, lease agreements, franchise agreements, employment 
contracts.
Other or not classified Intangible assets classified either as "intangible assets" or "other intangible 
assets".
 
 
Table 6 summarizes the amounts of intangible assets recognized by the sample companies as 
well as the number of companies reporting intangible assets belonging to each category. 
 
Table 6. Intangible assets by category. 
This table summarizes the amounts of intangible assets in the sample data by category. In addition, the table lists the number of 
companies that reported a certain category of intangible assets. 
Number of companies reporting intangible assets 
belonging to the category
Total value of intangible assets in 
the category (m€)
Intangible assets
Customer related 28 1.45
Technology-based 8 0.73
Marketing related 13 0.52
Contract-based 7 0.09
Other or not classified 20 0.29
Total 3.08
 
 
Intangible assets were recognized by 43 companies, which represent 70% of the sample 
companies. Customer related intangible assets were the most recognized assets. Customer related 
intangible assets were recognized by 28 companies (65% of the companies reporting intangible 
assets). Marketing related, technology-based and contract-based intangible assets were reported 
by 13 (30%), 8 (19%) and 7 (16%) companies, respectively. Overall 20 (47%) companies 
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reported intangible assets classified as plain “intangible assets” or “other intangible assets”. It is 
likely, however, that those assets would actually fall into at least one of the categories presented 
above but the information is simply not disclosed.  
 
Table 7. Purchase price allocation by industry. 
This table presents the purchase price allocation of the sample companies in 2007 by the acquirer's industry.  A statistical 
significance of difference between the industry's average and other industries' averages on 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by 
***, ** and *, respectively. The respective control group in a statistically significant difference between groups is bolded without 
the asterisks. 
TMT CIP FIN Other All less TMT Total
Intangible assets
Customer related 22 % 2 % 2 % 24 % 5 % 14 %
Technology-based 12 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 7 %
Marketing related 6 % 7 % 0 % 0 % 3 % 5 %
Contract-based 1 % 1 % 0 % 0 % 2 % 1 %
Other or not classified 0 % 12 % 0 % 1 % 10 % 3 %
Intangible assets total 41%** 21 % 2 % 24 % 20 % 30 %
Goodwill 20 % 60% 54 % 71 % 40 % 35 %
Other net assets 39 % 18% 45%*** 5 % 40 % 35 %
Total purchase price (€bn) 6.15 2.28 1.57 0.15 4.01 10.16
 
 
The average purchase price allocation by industry is presented in table 7. Statistical significances 
of differences between average allocations in the five industry categories were tested by 
employing Student’s two-tailed t-test. 
 
Overall, 30% of the total purchase price was allocated to intangible assets, 35% to goodwill and 
35% to other net asset. Acquisitions totaling €6.15 billion were made in technology, media and 
telecom industry. These acquisitions covered over a half of the total purchase price of €10.16 
billion. However, the transaction between Nokia and Siemens to form Nokia Siemens Networks 
constituted almost 90% of the total purchase price in TMT. In consumer and industrial products 
industry, the total purchase price was €2.28 billion and in the financial services industry €1.57 
billion. However, there were 34 companies reporting acquisitions in CIP, whereas the number of 
companies reporting acquisitions in FIN was only 7, which implies that the average deal size in 
FIN was a lot bigger than in CIP (and also in TMT). 
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The highest average proportion of the purchase price allocated to intangible assets was in TMT 
(41% of total purchase price was allocated to intangible assets). Companies operating in TMT 
allocate proportionately more to other intangible assets than other companies combined. The 
finding is statistically significant at 5% level and thus supports H4 stating that companies 
operating in technology, media and telecom sector allocate a larger proportion of the purchase 
price to intangible assets than companies operating in other sectors. This finding is line with 
theories presented by (Collins et al., 1997, Lev and Zarowin, 1999) that more investments in 
intangible assets are made in high tech industries. In addition, companies in TMT allocate 
proportionately more to intangible assets than companies operating in CIP and FIN alone. 
However, these findings are statistically significant only at 10% significance level.  
 
Average allocation to goodwill was the highest in CIP, where 60% of the total purchase price 
was allocated to goodwill on average. No statistically significant differences between industries 
were found. 
 
The highest average proportion allocated to other net assets was in FIN, where 45% of the total 
purchase price was allocated to other net assets. Higher average allocation to other net assets in 
FIN than TMT and CIP is statistically significant at 1% significance level. The finding is logical 
since companies operating in FIN often acquire financial assets instead of intangible assets such 
as technology or software.  
 
The most recognized intangible assets were customer related assets representing 14% of the total 
purchase price. In TMT customer related intangible assets constituted 22% of the total purchase 
price, whereas in CIP and FIN customer related assets covered only 2% of both industries’ total 
purchase price.  12% of the total purchase price in CIP was allocated to other intangible assets 
(or the type of the intangible assets was not disclosed), which means that companies in CIP 
acquired almost €300 million worth of intangible assets they did not disclose specific 
information on.  
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7.4 Results of the multivariate tests 
7.4.1 Allocation to goodwill 
Table 8. Multivariate OLS regression analysis of characteristics influencing allocation to goodwill. 
This table presents the results of multivariate OLS regression analysis. Dependent and explanatory variables are as defined in 
section 6.2.  The sample consists of all companies listed in OMX Helsinki reporting acquisitions in 2007 less companies 
operating in the financial services industry (N=54) . T-statistics are presented in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
Explanatory variable Expected sign 1 2 3 4
LNMCAP - -0.05** -0.06** -0.06** -0.05**
(-2.18) (-2.12) (-2.16) (-2.03)
PRICETOBOOK - 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.04) (0.33) (0.23) (0.78)
PROFITABILITY - 0.63*** 0.47 0.59**
(2.75) (1.11) (2.41)
CEOAGE + 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.68) (0.58) (0.69) (0.37)
CEOTENURE - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.93) (-0.77) (-0.84) (-0.57)
LEVERAGE - -0.20 -0.13 -0.39
(-0.45) (-0.33) (-0.92)
RDTONETSALES ? -0.00 -0.02**
(-0.35) (-2.13)
TMT + 0.20 0.17 0.29
(0.92) (0.86) (1.39)
CIP ? 0.24 0.22 0.31
(1.15) (1.10) (1.58)
Constant 0.63 0.56 0.50 0.68
(1.70) (1.14) (1.09) (1.43)
R² 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.19
Adjusted R² 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.04
F-value 2.19** 1.27 1.45 1.27
N 54 54 54 54
Variable definitions:
GOODWILL = Allocation to goodwill
CEOAGE = The end of the fiscal period 2007 - CEO date of birth
CEOTENURE = The end of the fiscal period 2007 - the date the CEO took office
LEVERAGE = 2006 - 2007 year-end average of 1 - Equity/Total assets
PROFITABILITY = Return on assets (ROA) = Earnings before interests and taxes (2007)/Total assets (2007)
RDTONETSALES = Average of 2005 - 2007 R&D expenses/Net sales
PRICETOBOOK = Market capitalization (2007)/Equity (2007)
LNMCAP = ln(Market capitalization (2007))
CIP = Dummy variable for consumer or industrial product industry
TMT = Dummy variable for technology, media and telecom industry
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To test the impact of the acquirer’s characteristics on the proportionate amount of the total 
intangible assets allocated to goodwill, four regression runs are performed. The regressions 
include all OMX companies reporting acquisitions in 2007 less companies operating in the 
financial services industry. The first model includes variables that, based on theory and prior 
research, bear strong expectations related to their explanatory power regarding goodwill. The 
second model includes all explanatory variables. The third model includes the same sample and 
variables as the second one with the exception that in the third one RDTONETSALES is 
removed, since strong correlation between RDTONETSALES and PROFITABILITY was 
detected. In the fourth model, the same sample is included as in models 1-3, but 
RDTONETSALES is added back and PROFITABILITY is removed.  
 
The results of all four regression runs are presented in table 8. The results are interesting. Only 
the first model returns a statistically significant F-value (at 5% significance level), which was 
expected as the first model includes only the variables that bear strong expectations regarding 
goodwill. Therefore, the discussion concentrates mainly on the results of the first regression 
model. 
 
R²-values remain rather low in all four runs varying between 0.19-0.21 (adjusted R²-values 
between 0.04-0.10). As expected, the first model returned the highest adjusted R²-value (0.10) 
meaning that 10% of the variance in GOODWILL is explained by model 1.  
 
To  complement  the  analysis  of  allocation  to  goodwill,  statistical  significances  of  differences  
between average allocations in test variable sub-groups are examined by employing Student’s 
two-tailed t-test. The results of the complementary analysis are presented in table 9. 
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Table 9. Complementary analysis of allocation to goodwill. 
This table presents comparison of average allocations to goodwill between sub-groups of the test variables. Statistical 
significance between the averages at 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
>55 # of companies 55-50
# of 
companies <50
# of 
companies
CEOAGE 0.65 16 0.56 16 0.60 22
>10% # of companies 10%-5%
# of 
companies <5%
# of 
companies
PROFITABILITY (ROA) 0.61 25 0.69 15 0.50 14
>2.5 # of companies 2.5-1.5
# of 
companies <1.5
# of 
companies
PRICETOBOOK 0.59 20 0.62 20 0.60 14
Large cap 
(>1bn€)
# of 
companies Mid-cap (1bn€ -150m€)
# of 
companies
Small cap 
(<150m€)
# of 
companies
LNMCAP 0.58 21 0.52 13 0.69 20
 
 
The first hypothesis as presented in section 5.2 is as follows: 
 
H1. There is a positive association between the age of the CEO and allocation to goodwill.  
 
CEOAGE gets a slightly positive value in all four runs, but the associations are not statistically 
significant. This contradicts with findings of Zhang and Zhang (2007) who found that the 
purchase price allocation decision is used as an earnings management tool by older CEOs.  
 
There could be several explanations for this contradiction. First of all, social differences between 
Finland and the United States probably exist. CEO’s may not want to engage in earnings 
management in Finland if it is not, for instance, approved by their colleagues. Secondly, bonus 
schemes between Finland and the United States may differ. In Finland, the bonus schemes may 
be bound to certain measures that cannot be affected by the purchase price allocation decision. 
Third, Van de Poel et al. (2008) found that Big 4 auditors constrain the use of goodwill treatment 
as an earning management tool. The majority of the companies listed in OMX Helsinki are 
audited by a Big 4 company, which could place the companies under closer scrutiny by auditors 
and remove the possibility of earnings management conducted by excess allocation to goodwill. 
According to Pender (2001), goodwill impairment charges are likely to lead to dismissal of 
management. Compared to the United States, Finland is a small country and being dismissed as a 
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result of impairment charges might damage one’s reputation more in Finland than it does in the 
United States. Avoiding dismissal and keeping one’s reputation may be a stronger incentive than 
straight monetary bonuses. Or it could be that CEOs are not responsible for the allocation of the 
purchase price and e.g. the CFO of the company may be entrusted to conduct the allocation of 
the purchase price.  
 
Table 9 shows that the average allocation to goodwill is the highest in companies where the age 
of the CEO is above 55 years but it does not differ from other groups at a statistically significant 
level. It is notable that companies with CEOs at the age of 50-55 years allocate less to goodwill 
than companies with CEOs younger than 50 years. This implicates that the assumption that the 
older the CEO the larger the allocation to goodwill does not seem to apply when moved further 
away from the retirement age. 
 
No evidence to support hypothesis H1 stating that there is a positive association between the age 
of the CEO and allocation to goodwill was found. Therefore, H1 is rejected. 
 
The second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2. There is a negative association between the acquirer’s profitability and allocation to 
goodwill.   
 
Contrary to the hypothesis, PROFITABILITY gets a positive value in the first regression at 1% 
significance level. The logic behind this could be that the more profitable the company, the more 
cash it is likely to have to spend on acquisitions. As acquisitions are often auctioned between 
several bidders, the higher the bid, the bigger is the probability of winning the auction. Cash rich 
companies may ensure the win by paying a large goodwill in excess of the value of other 
intangible  assets.  The  positive  sign  of  PROFITABILITY  contradicts  with  the  theory  that  the  
purchase price allocation decision is used to smooth earnings. PROFITABILITY gets positive 
values also in the second and third regressions, but neither of the models is statistically 
significant. The complementary analysis is in line with the multivariate results even though no 
statistical significances between the average allocations to goodwill in the three sub-groups exist. 
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The proportionate average allocation to goodwill is the lowest in companies with return on assets 
less than 5%. 
 
The sign of PROFITABILITY is the opposite of the expected sign, which gives no support to 
hypothesis 2 stating that a negative association between the acquirer’s profitability and allocation 
to goodwill exists. Thus, H2 is rejected.  
 
The third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3. There is a negative association between the acquirer’s growth prospects and allocation 
to goodwill. 
 
PRICETOBOOK gets positive values in all four regressions. Even though any of the findings is 
not statistically significant, the signs contradict with theory of nature of growth firms’ goodwill 
(Ojala, 2001). The theory suggests that growth companies have only a limited period of time to 
exploit their goodwill due to the rapidly changing business environment. Unless the goodwill is 
quickly exploited, it will become worthless. This would encourage growth companies to allocate 
as little to goodwill as possible. H3 is based on that assumption and signaling theory but no 
evidence to support H3 was found. The complementary analysis provides no statistically 
significant results, either. The contradictory signs of the coefficients in relation to the theory of 
nature of growth firms’ goodwill may imply that companies with larger price-to-book ratios have 
more positive expectations as regards to the future cash flows and, therefore, more goodwill can 
be recorded as impairments of the excess goodwill are less likely, as suggested by Zhang and 
Zhang (2007). 
 
As evidence of a negative association between the acquirer’s growth prospects and allocation to 
goodwill is not found, H3 is rejected. 
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The fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H4. Companies operating in Technology, Media and Telecom sector allocate a larger 
proportion of the purchase price to intangible assets than companies operating in other 
sectors. 
 
The fourth hypothesis was tested in section 7.3 by employing Student’s two-tailed t-test. The 
average allocation of the purchase price to other intangible assets in TMT was 41%, whereas the 
respective figure in all other industries combined was 20%. The difference is statistically 
significant at 5% significance level and, therefore, support for H4 was found.  
 
The fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H5. There is a negative association between the acquirer’s size and allocation to goodwill.   
 
LNMCAP gets a negative value in each of the regressions. The finding is significant at 5% 
significance level in the first regression and, therefore, in line with the underlying theories 
presented in connection with hypotheses development suggesting that larger companies have 
more accounting resources and/or are more exposed to political costs. 
 
According to FFSA (2006, 2007) and Intangible Business (2007), many companies lack the 
resources to thoroughly conduct the process of purchase price allocation and, as a consequence, 
may be tempted to allocate the excess purchase price entirely to goodwill even if there are 
identifiable intangible assets.  
 
Moreover, the political cost theory suggest that larger companies are under closer scrutiny by 
government agencies and thus more exposed to political costs and believe that the pressure of the 
unwelcome scrutiny will ease along with better reporting. Better reporting, in terms of purchase 
price allocation, means identifying and recognizing as many identifiable assets apart from 
goodwill as possible. 
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The complementary analysis shows that companies belonging to OMX Helsinki Small Cap 
allocate proportionately more to goodwill than companies in Mid-Cap and Large Cap, which 
supports the findings of the multivariate analysis. However, no statistically significant 
differences between the average allocations to goodwill in the different sub-groups are 
documented. 
 
LNMCAP gets a negative value in the first model at 5% significance level and thus, support for 
H5 is found. 
 
The rest of the explanatory variables’ signs are as expected. Both TMT and CIP get positive (but 
not statistically significant) values in all four regressions.  
 
All in all, evidence of the test variables’ impact on goodwill implicating that discretion is used in 
the allocation decision is rather exiguous. The original purpose of the examination of allocation 
to other net assets was to illustrate the role that verifiability plays in the allocation process. The 
modesty of the findings related to use of discretion in the allocation decision somewhat 
diminishes the significance of that purpose. Nevertheless, LNMCAP gets a negative sign as 
expected at a 5% level and, therefore, allocation to other net assets is examined. In addition, it is 
interesting to see whether allocation to other net assets can be explained by regression models 9-
12. 
7.4.2 Allocation to other intangible assets 
 
To test the impact of the acquirer’s characteristics on the proportionate amount of the purchase 
price  allocated  to  intangible  assets,  four  regression  runs  are  performed.  The  settings  of  all  the  
four runs in terms of the sample and explanatory variables are the same as in section 7.4.1. The 
results of the regression analysis are presented in table 10. 
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Table 10. Multivariate OLS regression analysis of characteristics influencing allocation to other intangible 
assets. 
This table presents the results of multivariate OLS regression analysis. Dependent and explanatory variables are as defined in 
section 6.2.  The sample consists of all companies listed in OMX Helsinki reporting acquisitions in 2007 less companies 
operating in the financial services industry (N=54) . T-statistics are presented in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
Explanatory variable Expected sign 5 6 7 8
LNMCAP + 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.18) (0.29) (0.33) (0.16)
PRICETOBOOK + 0.04 0.04 0.05* 0.02
(1.60) (1.34) (1.69) (0.79)
PROFITABILITY - -0.82*** -0.56 -0.82***
(-4.22) (-1.63) (-4.06)
CEOAGE ? -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-0.39) (-0.15) (-0.38) (0.18)
CEOTENURE ? -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.29) (-0.93) (-0.81) (-1.21)
LEVERAGE - -0.18 -0.34 0.04
(-0.50) (-1.04) (0.10)
RDTONETSALES + 0.01 0.02***
(0.92) (3.76)
TMT + 0.14 0.21 0.04
(0.78) (1.26) (0.23)
CIP ? 0.12 0.17 0.03
(0.73) (1.06) (0.21)
Constant 0.40 0.23 0.36 0.07
(1.28) (0.58) (0.96) (0.18)
R² 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.34
Adjusted R² 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.22
F-value 4.59*** 2.94*** 3.22*** 2.88***
N 54 54 54 54
Variable definitions:
OTHERINTANGIBLES = Allocation to other intangible assets
CEOAGE = The end of the fiscal period 2007 - CEO date of birth
CEOTENURE = The end of the fiscal period 2007 - the date the CEO took office
LEVERAGE = 2006 - 2007 year-end average of 1 - Equity/Total assets
PROFITABILITY = Return on assets (ROA) = Earnings before interests and taxes (2007)/Total assets (2007)
RDTONETSALES = Average of 2005 - 2007 R&D expenses/Net sales
PRICETOBOOK = Market capitalization (2007)/Equity (2007)
LNMCAP = ln(Market capitalization (2007))
CIP = Dummy variable for consumer or industrial product industry
TMT = Dummy variable for technology, media and telecom industry
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All four models get F-values that indicate statistical significance of the model at 1% significance 
level. R²-values vary between 0.32 and 0.38 and adjusted R²-values between 0.22 and 0.25. Even 
though the second model as a whole is statistically significant, any of the individual explanatory 
variables does not get a value that is statistically significant. This implies that harmful 
multicollinearity is present as the analysis in section 7.1.3 suggests.  
 
In first and third regressions, PROFITABILITY gets a statistically significant negative value at 
1% significance level indicating that the more profitable the company, the smaller the 
proportionate allocation to other intangible assets. A possible explanation for this could be that 
companies that have already reached a high level of profitability do not acquire companies 
because of intangible assets such as brands or customer lists. Profitable companies are likely to 
already have a strong brand or a solid customer base and they may not feel the need to acquire 
such assets. 
 
In the third regression, PRICETOBOOK gets a positive value at 10% significance level, which 
suggests that companies with higher growth prospects allocate proportionately more to intangible 
assets. This finding is in line with the argument of Deloitte (2007) that the value of a company 
exceeding the book value of its assets can be, to a large extent, ascribed to intangible assets. 
However, 10% level is not generally considered sufficient evidence of a significant association.  
 
In the fourth regression, RDTONETSALES get a positive value that is statistically significant at 
1% significance level. This finding is logical for two reasons: Engaging in extensive R&D 
activity is likely to lead to intangible assets such as patents or software. Moreover, companies are 
likely to acquire companies within the same industry. Therefore, the acquired companies are also 
likely to have a larger proportion of intangible assets to be identified and recognized in 
connection with the purchase price allocation.   
 
The  signs  of  the  other  variables  are  as  expected  but  none  of  the  values  the  other  explanatory  
variables get is statistically significant. TMT and CIP get positive values also when allocation to 
other intangible assets is used as a dependent variable.  
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In general, the results are logical and as expected (e.g. the statistically significant positive value 
of RDTONETSALES). The reversed inspection gives no evidence, based on which it could be 
argued that discretion is used in the allocation decision that would make the reported allocation 
deviate from the underlying economics.  
 
7.4.3 Allocation to other net assets  
 
To test the impact of the acquirer’s characteristics on the remaining component of the purchase 
price,  other  net  assets,  four  regression  runs  are  performed.  The  settings  of  all  the  four  runs  in  
terms of the sample and explanatory variables are the same as in sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2. The 
results of the regression analysis are presented in table 11. 
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Table 11.  Multivariate OLS regression analysis of characteristics influencing allocation to other net assets. 
This table presents the results of multivariate OLS regression analysis. Dependent and explanatory variables are as defined in 
section 6.2.  The sample consists of all companies listed in OMX Helsinki reporting acquisitions in 2007 less companies 
operating in the financial services industry (N=54) . T-statistics are presented in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
Explanatory variable Expected sign 9 10 11 12
LNMCAP ? 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
(1.35) (1.16) (1.17) (1.25)
PRICETOBOOK - -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04
(-1.64) (-1.55) (-1.67) (-1.20)
PROFITABILITY + 0.61** 0.56 0.59**
(2.29) (1.19) (2.17)
CEOAGE ? -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.45)
CEOTENURE ? 0.27** 0.02 0.02 0.03*
(2.01) (1.58) (1.60) (1.81)
LEVERAGE + 0.26 0.27 0.04
(0.52) (0.63) (0.09)
RDTONETSALES - -0.00 -0.01*
(-0.08) (-1.77)
TMT - -0.37 -0.37* -0.27
(-1.50) (-1.70) (-1.16)
CIP - -0.27 -0.28 -0.18
(-1.19) (-1.28) (-0.84)
Constant 0.11 0.32 0.31 0.48
(0.26) (0.59) (0.61) (0.91)
R² 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.25
Adjusted R² 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.12
F-value 2.68** 1.87* 2.15** 1.91*
N 54 54 54 54
Variable definitions:
OTHERNETASSETS = Allocation to other net assets
CEOAGE = The end of the fiscal period 2007 - CEO date of birth
CEOTENURE = The end of the fiscal period 2007 - the date the CEO took office
LEVERAGE = 2006 - 2007 year-end average of 1 - Equity/Total assets
PROFITABILITY = Return on assets (ROA) = Earnings before interests and taxes (2007)/Total assets (2007)
RDTONETSALES = Average of 2005 - 2007 R&D expenses/Net sales
PRICETOBOOK = Market capitalization (2007)/Equity (2007)
LNMCAP = ln(Market capitalization (2007))
CIP = Dummy variable for consumer or industrial product industry
TMT = Dummy variable for technology, media and telecom industry
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F-values indicate statistical significance of every model either at 5% or 10% significance level. 
R²-values for all four models fall between 0.22 and 0.28 (adjusted R²-values between 0.12 and 
0.15).  
 
PROFITABILITY did get a statistically significant negative value (at 1% level) in allocation to 
other intangible assets. As a possible reason for the negative correlation it was suggested that 
companies with a higher level of profitability do not acquire companies to acquire intangible 
assets. Profitable companies are likely to already have e.g. a strong brand or a solid customer 
base, which often form a part of the excess purchase price and act as drivers for acquisitions. In 
regression 2, PROFITABILITY gets a positive value at 5% significance level, which supports 
the reasoning presented above. It could be that companies with high profitability are likely to 
acquire companies to get in possession of the tangible assets of the acquiree. 
 
TMT gets a negative value in regression 3 at 10% significance level providing modest evidence 
that companies operating in TMT allocate less to other net assets. This finding is logical since 
TMT is an intangible assets intensive industry and does not usually involve e.g. heavy 
production machinery.  
 
In regression 4, modest evidence of a negative association between RDTONETSALES and 
allocation to other net assets was found. The association is not surprising, since extensive R&D 
activity often results in intangible asset.  
 
Regressions 1 and 4 show interesting results in terms of CEOTENURE. They show that there is 
a positive association between the length of the CEO’s tenure and allocation to other net assets. 
The finding is statistically significant at 5 % level in regression 1 and at 10% level in regression 
4. 
 
A possible explanation for the positive association could be that the longer the CEO has been in 
the  office,  the  better  she/he  knows  the  company  and  the  industry.  Based  on  the  extensive  
knowledge in the industry the CEO can better evaluate the true value of the acquired company, 
which would result in a smaller amount of the excess purchase price over the book value of net 
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tangible assets. Zhang and Zhang (2007) found there to be a negative association between the 
length of the CEO’s tenure and allocation to goodwill, which is in line with the reasoning 
presented above. 
 
Evidence of a significant negative association between allocation to goodwill and the size of the 
acquirer was found in model 1 in section 7.4.1. Similar evidence of an association between 
allocation to other net assets and LNMCAP is not found, which somewhat supports the findings 
of Zhang and Zhang (2007) that the verifiability of assets plays an important role in the 
allocation process. However, statistically significant associations between allocation to other net 
assets and explanatory variables were found implicating that some consistencies in allocation to 
other net assets do exist, which contradicts with findings of Zhang and Zhang (2007). 
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8. Conclusions 
8.1 Summary and implications 
8.1.1 Summary of the findings 
 
OLS regression analysis was conducted in order to test if discretion is used in the purchase price 
allocation that would make the reported allocation deviate from the underlying economics. The 
possible impact was tested separately on goodwill, other intangible assets and other net assets. In 
addition, a complementary Student’s two-tailed t-test analysis on allocation to goodwill was 
performed in order to deepen the analysis on allocation to goodwill. Similarly, Student’s two-
tailed t-test was employed in order to test the differences in the average allocations between 
industries. 
 
No evidence was found that discretion in the allocation decision is used in order to manage 
earnings. Instead, a negative association between the size of the acquirer and proportionate 
allocation to goodwill was documented implying that scarcity of accounting resources or 
political costs impact the allocation decision. The following summarizes the findings at a more 
detailed level. 
  
Allocation to goodwill 
 
H1 suggested that there is a positive association between the age of the CEO and allocation to 
goodwill. The hypothesis was based on the findings of Zhang and Zhang (2007) that older CEOs 
allocate more to goodwill in order to avoid intangible asset amortizations that would depress 
accounting earnings, to which CEOs’ bonus incentives are often bound. Recording a 
proportionately larger amount to goodwill would enable the CEO to postpone the impairments of 
goodwill beyond her/his resignation and enable bigger bonuses before retiring.  
 
No evidence of an association between the age of the CEO and allocation to goodwill was found. 
Therefore, the conclusion based on the statistical test is that in Finland older CEOs are not more 
likely to allocate more to goodwill than younger CEOs.  
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H2 suggested that the purchase price allocation decision is used to smooth earnings based on the 
same logic as presented in H1 but H2 suggested that the profitability of the acquirer is negatively 
associated with the amount allocated to goodwill. The less profitable the company, the more it 
allocates to goodwill in order to be able to postpone goodwill impairments into the future and 
conduct the impairments when the accounting earnings look better and such impairments do not 
depress the earnings below certain levels, e.g. below zero or below analysts’ estimates.  
 
However, evidence of a negative association between profitability of the acquirer and allocation 
to goodwill was not found. Instead, a positive association between PROFITABILITY and 
allocation to goodwill was documented. The logic behind this could be that as acquisitions are 
often auctioned between several bidders, the higher the bid, the bigger is the probability of 
winning the auction. Cash rich companies may ensure the win by paying a large goodwill in 
excess of the value of other intangible assets. 
 
H3 suggested that there is a negative association between the acquirer’s growth prospects and 
allocation to goodwill. The hypothesis was based on the nature of growth firms’ goodwill and 
signaling theories.  
 
No evidence to support H3 was found. It could imply that the nature of growth firms’ goodwill is 
more lasting than assumed in the theory. As for signaling, the investors may not see allocating 
the purchase price to goodwill as a way to postpone expensing but instead see goodwill as a 
means for growth. Price-to-book ratio used as a proxy for growth prospects may not actually 
capture the growth prospects of the acquiring company to a sufficient extent as it represents the 
investor’s estimations of the company’s future cash flows. Asymmetry of information and 
subjectivity may lead in deterioration of those estimations. However, using other indicators e.g. 
PEG (price-to-earnings-to-growth) -ratio as a proxy for growth prospects would be prone to the 
same problems as P/B-ratio. 
 
H5 argued that the bigger the acquiring company, the less it allocates to goodwill. As suggested 
in H5, evidence of a negative association between the acquirer’s size and allocation to goodwill 
was found. It could implicate that scarcity of accounting resources may have an impact on the 
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allocation decision as FFSA (2006, 2007) and Intangible Business (2007) suggested. Based on 
the multivariate analysis results, it seems that larger companies may have more extensive 
accounting resources available for more thorough purchase price allocation procedures than 
smaller companies. 
 
Another explanation could be the political cost theory suggesting that larger companies are under 
closer scrutiny than smaller companies and hope to ease the pressure of this unwelcome scrutiny 
by better reporting.  
 
Nevertheless, a large proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill does not necessarily 
mean that the allocation is not conducted in an appropriate manner. The proportion allocated to 
goodwill may represent genuine goodwill and thus no intangible assets can be identified and 
recognized apart from it. Based on this, a larger proportion allocated to goodwill may not, 
however, be regarded as insufficient reporting by the markets and, therefore, the lack of 
resources is a more probable explanation.  
 
Allocation to other intangible assets 
 
Evidence was found that the profitability level of the acquirer is negatively associated with 
allocation to other intangible assets. The finding implies that profitable companies may not 
acquire companies because of intangible assets (e.g. brands or customer lists) because they are 
likely to already have a strong brand or a solid customer base. 
 
In addition, evidence of a positive association between the R&D activity of the acquirer and 
allocation to intangible assets was found. This finding is logical since engaging in extensive 
R&D  activity  is  likely  to  lead  to  intangible  assets  such  as  patents  or  software  and  acquisition  
often take place within an industry. 
 
As a conclusion, testing the allocation to intangible assets (a reversed inspection) does not give a 
reason to suspect that the reported allocation deviates from the underlying economics.  
 
  
70 
Allocation to other net assets 
 
Evidence of a positive association between profitability of the acquirer and allocation to other net 
assets was found, which is in line with the finding that profitable companies are not likely to 
acquire companies for intangible assets.  
 
Moreover, evidence was found that there is a positive association between the length of the 
CEO’s tenure and allocation to other net assets. This finding could implicate that the longer the 
CEO has been in the office, the better she/he knows the industry. As consequence she/he can 
better evaluate the true value of the acquired company, which would result in smaller excess 
price. This is in line with the findings of Zhang and Zhang (2007) that there is a negative 
association between the length of the CEO’s tenure and allocation to goodwill. 
  
Evidence of a negative association between the size of the acquirer and allocation to goodwill 
was found but evidence of a similar association between allocation to other net assets and the 
acquirer’s size was not found, which somewhat supports the findings of Zhang and Zhang (2007) 
that the verifiability of assets plays an important role in the allocation process. However, certain 
associations between explanatory variables and allocation to other net assets were found 
implicating that some consistencies in allocation to other net assets exist, which contradicts with 
the findings of Zhang and Zhang (2007). 
 
Allocation between industries 
 
In  order  to  test  H4 (companies  operating  in  TMT allocate  more  to  intangible  assets  than  other  
companies operating in other industries), differences in the average allocations between 
industries were tested by employing Student’s two-tailed t-test. The test returned evidence (at 5% 
significance level) that companies operating in TMT do allocate more to intangible assets than 
companies operating in other industries, which is in line with the assumption that TMT is an 
intangible asset intensive industry. 
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In addition, the t-test provided evidence at 1% level that companies in FIN allocate more to other 
net assets than companies in TMT and CIP. The finding is logical, since companies in the 
financial services industry often acquire financial assets instead of intangible assets such as 
technology or software. 
8.1.2 Implications 
 
This paper has several implications. In general, it provides the investors with assurance that the 
variables included in this paper do not induce the use of the allocation decision as an earnings 
management tool in Finland. Moreover, it allows the investors to adjust their valuations based on 
the finding that larger companies are more likely to allocate the purchase price more thoroughly. 
In other words, the investors can take into account the possibility that smaller firms’ goodwill 
may actually include intangible assets that have not been recognized due to a lack of resources. 
The following paragraphs discuss the implications of the paper in more detail. 
 
First  of  all,  the  results  show  that  older  CEOs  are  not  more  likely  to  strive  to  allocate  a  larger  
proportion of the purchase price to goodwill in Finland, e.g. in hope for larger bonuses (which 
are often bound to accounting earnings). Evidence of the negative impact of the profitability 
level of the acquirer or growth prospects on allocation to goodwill was not found, either.  
 
Based on these, it can be inferred that discretion is not used in the purchase price allocation by 
the CEO in order to claim bigger bonuses prior to retiring or to lift the accounting earnings up to 
a certain level (e.g. above analysts’ estimates) in order to avoid a slump in the share price. 
Moreover, no evidence was found that companies with higher growth prospects would avoid 
recording goodwill (which might have resulted in misevaluation of other intangible assets).  
 
Instead, a negative association between the size of the acquirer and allocation to goodwill was 
documented implying that smaller companies may neglect the allocation procedure due to 
scarcity of accounting resources and allocate excessively to goodwill. An alternative explanation 
may be the larger political costs that larger companies face. 
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Second, a few logical associations between certain company characteristics and allocation of 
purchase price between goodwill, other intangible assets and other net assets were found. These 
findings implicate that the purchase price allocation reporting corresponds to the underlying 
economics, at least to an extent. For example, companies operating in technology, media and 
telecom sector allocate more to intangible assets than companies operating other industries. Had 
such association not been found, it could have also been a sign that the reported allocations are 
not in line with the underlying economics, since TMT is an intangible asset intensive industry. A 
positive association between the R&D activity of the acquirer and allocation to intangible assets 
was found, from which similar conclusions can be drawn. 
 
These findings provide the capital markets with more information to be taken into account when 
performing valuations on companies and aid the markets to adjust the valuations accordingly. A 
valuation model is only as good as its assumptions and the more solid information the markets 
have, the more accurate are the valuations. Mergers and acquisitions often constitute a 
remarkable part of companies’ growth and, therefore, assessing the future performance of the 
acquired entities is of vital importance in assessing the future value of the company.   
 
However, even though no evidence of earnings management driven use of discretion in the 
allocation decision was found, these findings do not exclude the possibility that discretion is used 
and that the reported allocations in fact do deviate more from the underlying economics. 
Therefore, further research is called for. The limitations of this paper and suggestions for further 
research are discussed in sections 8.2 and 8.3. 
 
8.2 Limitations 
This paper has certain limitations. First of all, this paper concentrates on companies listed on 
OMX Helsinki and no generalization regarding other countries can be done. Moreover, the data 
covers only year 2007. In order to achieve more comprehensive results, a study including a 
larger sample should be conducted.  
In addition, purchase price allocation is rapidly changing and the findings of this paper are not 
likely to be of good indication about the future state of purchase price allocation. Results of data 
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gathered from 2008 financial statements may differ significantly compared to the results 
presented in this paper. Also, there might be variables not used in this paper that could be used in 
explaining the allocation of the purchase price. Some of the possible variables that could be 
involved are discussed in the next section. 
Lastly, this paper concentrates on the characteristics of the acquirer and does not take into 
account the characteristics of the acquiree, which could also have an impact on the allocation 
decision. 
8.3 Further research 
 
The results of this paper call for further research on use of accounting discretion in purchase 
price allocation. This paper assumed the characteristics of the acquiree to be similar to those of 
the acquirer regarding certain variables, which may not always be the case. Therefore, it would 
be of interest to also examine the attributes of the acquiree and whether they have an impact on 
the  allocation  decision.  However,  gathering  data  on  the  acquiree  could  prove  to  be  extremely  
troublesome, if not in certain cases impossible. 
 
Even though no evidence of use of earnings management driven discretion in the allocation 
decision was found, the possibility cannot be ruled out completely. Goodwill impairment tests 
have  to  be  carried  out  at  a  CGU (cash  generating  unit,  a  smallest  unit  that  a  cash  flow can  be  
attributed to) level.  Profitability levels of CGUs may also have an impact on the allocation 
decision. If goodwill is allocated (even excessively) to a certain CGU with a high profitability, 
an impairment may not be necessary as the future cash flow predictions for that unit are likely to 
be positive and indicate no reason for an impairment. If none of the CGUs is profitable enough to 
“hide” the goodwill (a large impairment is likely to lead to dismissal of management, Pender, 
2001), a larger proportion of intangible assets may be identified and recognized.   
 
The role of external appraises should also be further examined in the allocation process, since it 
is likely that external appraisers are more objective in the valuations as they are not a part of the 
bonus schemes bound to the acquirer’s earnings, for example.  
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R&D expenses were used as a control variable in this paper since they are likely to result in 
intangible assets such as technology or software. Similarly, it can be argued that more extensive 
advertising results in a stronger brand, which can also be identified and recognized in connection 
with the allocation. 
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Appendix 1. Normality of residuals. 
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Appendix 2. Homoskedasticity of residuals. 
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